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Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines: The Questionable
Role of Criminal Law in Contributory Infringement
Doctrine
Mark Bartholomew*
I. INTRODUCTION

Online technologies have created a new litigation locus for the
owners of copyrights, patents, and trademarks. Once content to
prosecute only actual infringers, intellectual property rights holders
now focus their attention on intermediaries that provide the means
for massive simultaneous infringement by thousands of separate
Internet users.' Like an elite police force that has elected to target
kingpins and ignore petty criminals, rights holders have begun to
eschew the direct infringers, instead setting their sights on bigger
game.'
This unprecedented litigation strategy has put sudden pressure
on courts to evaluate the liability of indirect infringers. But the
current state of contributory infringement doctrine offers inadequate
guidance, resulting in inconsistent adjudications. The recent

* Associate Professor of Law, University at Buffalo Law School, The State University
Mehra, and Eugene
of New York. The author would like to thank Cathleen Kaveney, Salil
Volokh as well as the participants in the Eighth Annual Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference at Stanford Law School and the 2008-2009 Faculty Workshop Series at the
University at Buffalo Law School for their helpful suggestions. Lindsay Bernstein and Doug
Smith provided valuable research assistance.
1. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing DigitalCopyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1353-54 (2004) (referring to new
strategy of copyright holders to enforce their rights against indirect infringers as a "seismic
shift" in copyright enforcement); see also 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:55
(2008) (describing sharp upturn in contributory infringement cases matching the increasing
popularity of the World Wide Web); Keith E. Witek, Software Patent Infringement on the
Internet and on Modern Computer Systems-Who is Liable for Damages?, 14 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 303, 304-33 (1998) (describing potential for "mass patent
infringement over the Internet" and concomitant pressure on secondary liability doctrine).
2. The Recording Industry Association of America recently announced that it would
discontinue lawsuits against individuals for illegally downloading music files, instead focusing
its efforts on pressuring internet service providers to take the initiative to prevent inappropriate
use of file sharing technology. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Recording Industry to Discontinue
LitigationProgram,Cites ChangingMarketplace, 77 U.S. L. WK. 2392 (2009).
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jurisprudence of the Ninth Circuit provides a perfect example. In less
than two months the court flip-flopped, finding that the
contributory liability standard was satisfied in the case of a search
engine that led Internet users to infringing websites but not in the
case of credit card companies that processed the payments that made
the same infringing websites financially viable.3 The court offered
little to explain the difference in the two outcomes, simply stating
that "location services" were somehow different than "payment
services. 4
Without a developed body of intellectual property case law on
which to base their opinions, federal courts have resorted to
importing secondary liability principles from other bodies of law to
justify their decisions. In shaping the modern rules of contributory
infringement, judges are relying on indirect liability doctrines from
common law tort and criminal law. The Supreme Court has
instructed the lower courts to mine tort law precedent to solve
contributory infringement questions.' Meanwhile, in the context of
an increasing criminalization of intellectual property law, analogies to
criminal prosecution of accomplices have taken root in contributory
infringement jurisprudence. For example, in the case of the credit
card companies mentioned above, Ninth Circuit judge Alex Kozinski
posited that the companies' provision of financial services for
infringing websites was akin to the help provided by the person who
drives the getaway car from an armed robbery or fronts the cash
necessary to purchase narcotics.6 For Kozinksi, criminal common law
provides a suitable source of content for civil infringement law.
These doctrinal moves elicit little controversy. If anything, courts
only face criticism from the legal academy when they supposedly
stray too far from common law principles in deciding infringement
7
cases.

3. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 824-25 (9th Cit. 2007).
4. Visa, 494 F.3d at 797 n.8. Six months later, the Ninth Circuit amended its opinion
in Amazon.corn, but did not alter its analysis of contributory liability. Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
5. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934-36 (2005); see also
BUC Int'l. Corp. v. Int'l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.19 (11th Cir. 2007).
6. Visa, 494 F.3d at 815.
7. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941,
1022 (2007) (faulting the Sony decision for failing to apply tort principles of secondary
liability); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright
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There is often a mismatch, however, between the guiding
justifications for criminal law and tort law and the very different
rationales for intellectual property protection. In short, the
contributory liability doctrine for the former bodies of law is a poor
fit for the latter. In a companion article, I contend that much more
analysis needs to be done before judges assessing contributory
infringement liability can learn anything useful from tort law's
contributory liability doctrine. 8 In this Article, I maintain that it does
not make sense for contributory infringement law to depend on the
same principles that determine the culpability of criminal
accomplices. Contributory infringement law and its criminal law
counterpart, known as "accomplice liability," have evolved in
different directions because they are animated by different principles.
Infringement law's explicitly nonretributive justification clashes with
the moral basis for criminal punishment of aiders and abettors of
crimes.
Nevertheless, a study of criminal contributory liability offers
insights into the current functioning and normative goals of
contributory infringement law.9 One way to find out more about the
nature of something is to juxtapose it against a related entity.10 Even
though contributory infringement doctrine should not be altered to
resemble its criminal law counterpart, scrutiny of accomplice liability
suggests some new ways of thinking about the liability of indirect
infringers. Close comparison of the secondary liability regimes of
criminal law and intellectual property law provides an explanation of
where contributory infringement law is and where it should go.
Part II of this Article introduces the doctrine of contributory
liability in intellectual property and details the controversies in this
Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REv. 143,
149 (2007) ("[T]he tort principles that have guided copyright law since its inception should
continue to guide copyright's further evolution."); Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines,and the
Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer,55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 815, 852 (2005) ("[Clourts have borrowed
too little from tort law in the existing construction of third party copyright liability."); Jason
Kessler, Note, Correcting the Standardfor Contributory Trademark Liability Over the Internet,
39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 375, 411 (2006) (calling for "preserving traditional
standards" of contributory liability in dealing with the new context of trademark infringement
via the Internet).
8. Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement (forthcoming
2010).
9. Cf.Jerome Hall, Interrelationsof CriminalLaw and Torts: I, 43 COLUM. L. REv.
753, 755 (1943).
10. Id.
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area of jurisprudence. A contributory infringer must be shown to
have "knowledge" of infringement and to "materially contribute" to
the infringement. The content of these two requirements is open to
question, particularly in the area of material contribution.
Part III examines the doctrine of accomplice liability. For
conviction of an accomplice, the prosecution must demonstrate that
the accomplice intended for the criminal action to occur. The
accomplice must also perform some sort of act in an effort to further
the crime, but may be liable even if the act was minimal and had no
effect on the crime or its perpetrator. Because accomplice liability
differs greatly from current application of intellectual property
contributory liability doctrine, the contours of intellectual property
law would be dramatically altered if the courts accepted analogies
like Judge Kozinski's.
Part IV maintains that remaking indirect infringement law in
criminal law's image would be unwise. The analogy between
accomplice liability and contributory infringement fails given careful
consideration of the reasons behind imposing criminal sanctions on
indirect actors. Accountability for accomplices requires a tight nexus
between the mental state of the defendant and the ultimate criminal
act committed by another. This paradigm cannot be used, however,
to structure contributory infringement law given the different
theoretical bases for the two secondary liability regimes and the
particular evidentiary issues accompanying infringement.
Instead, another organizing principle for contributory
infringement, outside of criminal law, must be found. In Part V, I
suggest that causal principles can be used to provide much needed
content for contributory infringement doctrine. Causation inherently
appeals to our own sense of responsibility. Although causation has
little impact on accomplice liability decisions, its familiarity to the
legal community in other contexts makes it an attractive source of
legal rules. Part V begins to sketch out what a doctrine of causation
for contributory infringement should look like.
II. CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY RULES IN COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK,
AND PATENT LAW

All three of the main intellectual property regimes, which include
copyright, trademark, and patent law, recognize some form of
secondary liability-the idea that one party may be held liable for
infringement even if it did not itself directly infringe on the
786
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intellectual property right at issue. Secondary liability can be broken
down into two distinct subcategories: contributory liability and
vicarious liability. Often a claim for contributory infringement is
coupled with a separate claim for vicarious liability. Nevertheless, the
two doctrines are different. Contributory liability and vicarious
liability have separate historical origins and theoretical justifications."
The main difference between the two subcategories is that vicarious
liability is based exclusively on the relationship between the
defendant and the direct infringer, while contributory liability is
based on the actions of the defendant as well as the defendant's state
of mind in relation to the underlying infringement.' 2 A party can be
held vicariously liable without any knowledge or participation in the
infringement. 13 An in-depth discussion of vicarious liability for
infringement and a comparison of that doctrine to vicarious liability
doctrines in criminal law are beyond the scope of this Article.' 4
Instead, this Article focuses on contributory infringement doctrine
and the evaluation of a defendant's contribution to another's
infringement-an evaluation that has given courts a great deal of
trouble.
There are two types of contributory infringement: knowing
facilitation and inducement. 5 For each type of infringement, the
11. See 5 PATRY, supra note 1, § 21:41 ("Vicarious liability and contributory
infringement are discrete doctrines with different elements, and thus it is important to analyze
a claim under the proper doctrine."). Although there have been many suggested answers for
why an employer or other supervisor should be responsible for the tortious conduct of its
employees, the most frequent suggestion is that vicarious liability is justified by the need to
distribute losses to solvent parties when direct tortfeasors lack the means to compensate victims
for their injuries. P.S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 22 (1967). In
contrast, contributory liability involves complicated questions of blameworthiness and
causation that are the exclusive subject of this Article.
12. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretationof
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985). To be held vicariously liable for either trademark
or copyright infringement, the defendant must have the right and ability to control the direct
infringer and the infringement must translate into a financial benefit for the defendant. Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729-30 (9th Cir. 2007).
13. See John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 127, 130 n.2
(2007) (distinguishing vicarious responsibility and contributory responsibility by noting that
being vicariously responsible means responsibility for another's wrongs "irrespective of one's
own participation in them").
14. Principles of vicarious liability for the torts of another date back at least to the
seventeenth century. THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 19 (1916). On the other hand,
criminal law rarely imposes liability vicariously. Michael S. Moore, Causing,Aiding, and the
Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 398-99 (2008).
15. PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
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defendant must possess a particular mental state with regard to the
infringing act. In addition, for each type of infringement the
defendant must take some action that contributes to the underlying
infringement. The content of the mental state and contribution
requirements vary depending on the type of contributory
infringement at issue. As described in more detail below, a defendant
must know of the infringing activity to be liable for knowing
facilitation, but proof of intent to cause the infringement is not
necessary. Knowing facilitation also requires the defendant to
commit some act in furtherance of the directly infringing conduct.
Even when there is proof of such an act and knowledge of the
infringing activity, defendants that supply technologies capable of
substantial noninfringing uses are exempt from knowing facilitation
liability. In contrast, a defendant must specifically intend for the
infringement to occur to be liable for inducement. Moreover, no safe
harbor exists for such a defendant, even if that defendant supplies a
technology that can be used for noninfringing purposes.
A. Knowing FacilitationInfringement 6
1. Contoursof the knowledge requirement
Copyright, trademark, and patent law set out two main
conditions for a finding of knowing facilitation. First, defendants
must have actual or constructive knowledge that their actions are
likely to facilitate infringement by another. Second, defendants'
actions must materially contribute to the infringement.1 7
All three intellectual property regimes prohibit aiding or
encouraging a direct infringer when the defendant can be expected
to have some knowledge of the infringing activity. Although
knowledge that the direct infringer's acts constitute infringement is
required for knowing facilitation infringement, proof of intent to
cause the infringement is not. 8 Thus, a defendant that is indifferent
2007).
16. Courts refer to the non-inducement variety of contributory infringement in a variety
of ways. Some merely refer to it as "contributory infringement." E.g., id. I have chosen the
term "knowing facilitation" to make clear that it is a subset of contributory infringement.
17. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971); Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The
Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1363, 1378 (2006).

18.

788
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to the presence or absence of infringement may be found
contributorily liable for patent infringement if it knew that the
component it was selling could be used to infringe. 9 Similarly, the
owner of a flea market was found contributorily liable for a t-shirt
vendor's trademark infringement even though the owner arguably
had no specific intent that the infringement take place."0
When actual knowledge is not present, courts investigate
whether a reasonably prudent person in the defendant's position
should have expected infringement.2 ' Mere suspicion that a
purchaser of the defendant's product will use that product to
infringe is not enough to satisfy the knowledge standard.2 2 Thus, the
Supreme Court held that a generic drug manufacturer did not meet
the knowledge standard for contributory liability merely because it
suspected that some unknown pharmacists would use its product to
infringe on comparable trademarked drugs.23 But courts are free to
use circumstantial evidence to impute knowledge to a defendant. For
example, the Federal Circuit inferred knowledge of patent
infringement when the defendant was a manufacturer of component
parts and the evidence showed that there was no available market for
those components except in the infringing system.24 In A&M
Records v. Napster,21 the distributor of peer-to-peer file sharing
software was found liable for knowing facilitation of infringement.2 6
In that case, the trial court inferred knowledge of copyright
infringement based on the Napster executives' own illegal

L. REV. 635, 657 (2007); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
19. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 425, 455 (D. Del. 1997)
("Actual intent to cause or contribute to infringement is not necessary to establish
contributory infringement.").
20. Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149
(7th Cir. 1992).
21. Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845-46
(11th Cir. 1990).
22. E.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25:18 (2008) ("[T]he supplier's duty does not go so far as to require him to
refuse to sell to dealers who merely might pass off its goods.").
23. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 (1982) (White, J.,
concurring).
24. Preemption Devices, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 1170, 1174 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
25. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
26. Id. at 1021-22.
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downloading of copyrighted works and their experience with
intellectual property rights and the recording industry.2 7
For two of the three main categories of intellectual property, a
safe harbor exists for defendants accused of supplying items that
facilitate infringement but can also be used for noninfringing
purposes. The immunity from contributory liability exists even when
the defendant is aware of the infringing activity. Section 271(c) of
the Patent Act exempts the supplier of "a staple article or commodity
of commerce" from liability even when the article is subsequently
used, with the supplier's knowledge, for infringement of a patent.2 8
Similarly, in copyright law, manufacturers of technologies having
"substantial noninfringing uses" are exempt from liability even if
they are aware of the infringing activity. 29 No such safe harbor exists
for accused secondary trademark infringers, although the Lanham
Act does provide certain limitations on the type of relief granted
against publishers and printers.' °
2. Materialcontribution
Even with actual or constructive knowledge of the direct
infringer's behavior, liability for knowing facilitation will not attach
to a secondary defendant unless the defendant "materially"
contributed to the infringement. 3' All three intellectual property
regimes require some act by the defendant that contributed to the
ultimate act of infringement before the defendant can be held
contributorily liable. For trademark law, this material contribution
can take the form of manufacturing or distributing the infringing
product or directly controlling and monitoring the instrumentality

27. Id. at 1020 n.5.The type of intellectual property at issue has some impact on the
knowledge requirement. Courts tend to view the knowledge requirement more generously
when the right at issue is a copyright. E.g., Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 285 F. Supp. 798, 801
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). On the other hand, in trademark law, the knowledge requirement for
contributory liability is a high standard for a plaintiff to meet; mere awareness of a potential for
infringement is not enough. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Campuzano, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 127879 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that a distributor's awareness of a similar scheme involving
someone other than the direct infringer is not enough to satisfy knowledge standard for
contributory liability).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
29. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2005).
31. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Rhyme Syndicate Music, 376 F.3d 615, 621 (6th Cir.
2004); Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2002).
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used by the direct actor to infringe. 2 Copyright law's material
contribution standard is similar,33 although some would argue that
the direct control and monitoring prong is read more flexibly in the
copyright context.3 4 Patent law imposes liability on sellers of
components or materials used to infringe."
The actions listed above are not an exclusive list. The law
remains frustratingly unclear as to what makes a defendant's
contribution material.3 6 Recently, the imprecise content of the
material contribution requirement sparked a heated debate among
the judges of the Ninth Circuit. In two separate Ninth Circuit cases,
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com and Perfect 10 v. Visa, website operator
Perfect 10 charged online intermediaries with contributory
infringement.3 Perfect 10 holds the copyrights to images of nude
models38 and rights to the trademark "Perfect 10.,,39 It operates a
website that allows subscribers to access the images for a monthly
fee.4 ° It maintained that Google and Visa facilitated copyright
infringement by rival websites that published Perfect 10's images
without authorization.4 1 According to Perfect 10, the Google search
engine promoted infringement by helping directly infringing
websites distribute their infringing content, and Visa encouraged
infringement by processing credit card payments made by consumers
to the infringing websites.42 In assessing both cases of contributory
32. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l. Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007);
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999).
33. Visa, 494 F.3d at 796.
34. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supranote 17, at 1391-94.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
36. The boundaries of contributory liability are even more uncertain when legal regimes
outside the United States are considered. See Lynda J.Oswald, International Issues in
Secondary Liabilityfor Intellectual Property Rights Infringement, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 247, 248
(2008).
37. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Visa, 494
F.3d 788. In a third case, Perfect 10 sued another intermediary, an Internet service provider,
for providing Internet connectivity to the unauthorized websites that posted Perfect 10's
copyrighted images. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007).
The Ninth Circuit concluded that section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
immunized the Internet service provider from liability, pending the district court's
determination of certain threshold factual issues. Id. at 1118.
38. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 713.
39. Visa, 494 F.3d at 793.
40. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 713.
41. Id.at 726; Visa, 494 F. 3d. at 796.
42. Perfect 10 also contended that Amazon.com promoted infringement by linking to
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liability, the Ninth Circuit claimed that it applied "the same basic
test" to examine whether the defendant "materially contribute[d]"
to that infringement."a Yet application of that test produced
dramatically different results.
In Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit remanded on the issue of
knowledge, but held that the search engine materially contributed to
the infringing conduct by helping the rogue websites find an
audience." It suggested that for contributory infringement disputes
"in the context of cyberspace," courts must be sensitive to the nature
of the Internet, which by "facilitat[ing] access to websites
throughout the world can significantly magnify the effects of
otherwise immaterial infringing activities." 4 5 In other words, in the
Ninth Circuit's view, contributory liability becomes more likely when
the defendant transacts business online.
Less than two months later, the court did an about-face. A
majority of a three-judge panel held that Visa's processing of online
credit payments could not materially contribute to the infringement
committed by a website that illegally distributed copyrighted images
and used the plaintiffs trademark without permission.4 6 The majority
contended that Visa's inability to directly control the content of the
infringing websites meant that it could not satisfy the material
contribution standard for either contributory copyright or trademark
infringement." It attempted to distinguish the Amazon.com decision
by arguing that "location services" are more "material" to
infringement than "payment services." 48 Yet nothing in the opinion
explained why a service that helps consumers find infringing content
is somehow more central to infringement than a service that makes it
possible for consumers to pay the direct infringer for that infringing
content. The majority rejected older contributory infringement
precedents, contending that tests "developed for a brick- and-mortar
world" were irrelevant.49
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Kozinksi took a more generous view

Google search engine results. Id. at 712.
43. Visa, 494 F.3d at 795.
44. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 729.
45. Id. at 728.
46. Visa, 494 F.3d at 796-800.
47. Id. at 805, 807.
48. Id. at 797 n.8.
49. Id.
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of the materiality requirement. He contended that the older
precedents demonstrated that Visa's actions did satisfy the material
contribution standard." Judge Kozinski maintained that Visa's
actions had to be material because there are no adequate payment
substitutes for credit cards on the Internet,"' and even if substitutes
existed, the ability to receive credit card payments makes
infringement possible on a mass scale. 2 The different outcomes of
the two Perfect 10 cases and the split between Judge Kozinski and
the Visa majority over the definition of material contribution testify
to the ambiguity surrounding knowing facilitation doctrine.
Nevertheless, despite the uncertainty over the material
contribution standard, some tentative principles can be gleaned from
the case law. One established principle provides that some action by
the defendant is definitely required. Showing that the defendant
benefited from the infringement is not enough. Nor is it enough to
demonstrate an action is only obliquely related to the act of
infringement. For example, a realtor was absolved from contributory
liability for a client's copying of copyrighted architectural plans even
though the realtor allegedly knew of the planned infringing activity
and received an above-average fee for arranging the sale of an
unimproved lot where the client built its infringing architectural
design. 53 Despite the evidence of knowledge and benefit, the court
denied liability because the realtor's role was too "attenuated" and
"only tangentially involved in the infringement." 4
Another principle evident in some of the cases is that materiality
can be determined by the nature of the relationship between the
defendant and the direct infringer. The leading treatise on copyright
law states that the defendant's action must directly contribute to the
infringement for there to be liability.
Similarly, contributory
trademark infringement also requires "a special, narrowly defined
56
relationship between the defendant and [an act of] infringement.5
50. Id. at 825 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 814.
52. Id.
53. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 291, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
54. Id. at 294.
55. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04, at
12-85 (2008) ("[I]n order to be deemed a contributory infringer, the authorization or
assistance must bear some direct relationship to the infringing acts ....").
56. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarksand Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet,41 HOus. L. REV. 777, 812 (2004).
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Often the material contribution standard is evaluated through the
concept of "control." If the defendant lacks control over the direct
infringer or the instrumentality used to infringe, courts tend to
conclude that the material contribution requirement has not been
satisfied. 7 Some cases suggest that a material contribution can be
found when the defendant provides the site and facilities for the
infringement to take place, presumably because ownership of such
facilities creates a relationship of control over the direct infringer.5 8
B. InducementInfringement
In addition to the knowing facilitation variety of infringement,
all of the intellectual property regimes recognize some form of
"inducement" liability where a party will be held responsible if they
encouraged the direct infringer with the specific intent to cause the
direct infringer to infringe.5 9 For example, inducement liability for
copyright infringement occurs when the defendant distributes a
technology "with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright."6 Although there has been some disagreement over the
type of intent required for inducement liability under patent law, the
Federal Circuit has recently confirmed that specific intent to infringe
must be proven.6" Likewise, trademark infringement plaintiffs
proceeding under an inducement theory must also prove an intent to
facilitate infringement on the part of the contributory defendant.6 2
57. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir.
1999); Fare Deals, Ltd., v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (D. Md.
2001); see also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) (stating
that a contributory copyright infringer must be "in a position to control the use of copyrighted
works by others").
58. E.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001);
Habeeba's Dance of the Arts, Ltd. v. Knoblauch, 430 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714-15 (S.D. Ohio
2006); Demetriades,690 F. Supp. at 293.
59. Adams, supranote 18, at 636.
60. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
61. DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also
Tal Kedem, Note, Secondary Liability for Actively Inducing Patent Infringement: Which
Intentions Pave the Road?, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1465, 1488-94 (2007) (arguing for the
recognition of the specific intent standard).
62. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982) (holding that
secondary trademark liability may be imposed "if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally
induces another to infringe a trademark"); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494
F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007) (evaluating Visa's intentional inducement trademark liability
under same standard as inducement of copyright infringement); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau,
MGM v. Grokster: JudicialActivism or Good Decision?, 74 UMKC L. REV. 921, 942 (2006)
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The key difference between knowing facilitation liability and
inducement liability is that inducement liability requires that the
defendant intend for the direct actor to infringe. Intent is not
necessary to find the defendant liable for knowing facilitation, which
only requires that the defendant know or should know of the
infringement.6 3
Just like the material contribution standard for knowing
facilitation infringement, many uncertainties surround the
inducement doctrine. First, the mental state requirement for
inducement is vague. The Supreme Court has offered minimal
guidance on how to draw the line between actions demonstrating
culpable intent and actions that fall short. 6'4 The Court also left
unanswered the question of whether a subjective belief that the
direct actor's conduct is not infringing insulates the defendant from
inducement liability. Indeed, courts have not answered whether a
defendant could be liable for encouraging another person to copy a
copyrighted work based on the erroneous belief that the other
person had a fair use right to the work.65 Similarly, the courts have
not addressed whether inducement liability will apply when a
defendant facilitates patent or trademark infringement believing that
the plaintiffs patent or trademark is invalid.6 6
Second, the courts have not determined what sorts of
contributions to infringement satisfy the requirements for
inducement liability. It remains an open question whether
inducement liability applies only to defendants who distribute an
infringing device or if it can apply to defendants who facilitate or
encourage infringement in other ways.67 Moreover, it remains
(stating that "inducing copyright infringement is analogous to inducing trademark
infringement").
63. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
64. Tiffany A. Parcher, Comment, The Fact and Fiction of Grokster and Sony: Using
FactualComparisonsto Uncover the Legal Rule, 54 UCLA L. REv. 509, 521 (2006).

65. Adams, supra note 18, at 635; Parcher, supranote 64, at 522-23.
66. Adams, supra note 18, at 635 n.2.
67. See Sverker K. Hogberg, The Searchfor Intent-Based Doctrinesof Secondary Liability
in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 949-50 & nn.208-09 (2006). Given
technological changes shaping the distribution of intellectual property and the prevalence of
user-generated content, intermediaries that do not distribute content themselves are becoming
increasingly important. Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats:
Reckoning the FutureBusiness Plansof Copyright-DependentTechnology Entrepreneurs,50 ARIZ.

L. REv. 577, 577-78 (2008). Hence, an inducement doctrine that exempts non-distributors
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unclear whether the same materiality standard required for knowing
facilitation liability applies or whether inducement plaintiffs may
dispense with a materiality standard altogether.6 8
However, it is clear that when the intent standard for
inducement liability has been satisfied, the safe harbors for supply of
substantially noninfringing materials are no longer available. The
Supreme Court's recent Grokster decision holds that the safe harbor
for provision of substantially noninfringing technologies does not
apply to defendants that "actively induce" infringement.6 9 In other
words, those who distribute technologies capable of noninfringing
uses with the intent of facilitating infringement will be liable.
Similarly, a defendant found to have actively induced patent
infringement cannot take advantage of the exemption for
distribution of a "staple article of commerce." 7 °
As illustrated by the rift between the majority and Judge
Kozinksi in the Visa case and by Table 1 below, the content of the
contribution standard for both types of contributory infringement
remains uncertain. Given this uncertainty, courts have turned to legal
analogies outside of intellectual property law to find purchase for
their decisions. The next Part describes how the material
contribution standard is evaluated in determining indirect liability for
criminal conduct and why this standard should not be applied to civil
intellectual property disputes.

from liability would fail to capture key intermediaries in the production and dissemination of
infringing content.
68. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 800-02 (9th Cir.
2007) (indicating that the two types of contributory liability could be described as "material
contribution liability" and "inducement liability") with Sumit R. Shah, Note, Modding the
Web: Secondary Liability Under Copyright and Web Modification Software in a Post-Grokster
World, 85 TEX. L. REv. 703, 726 n.159 (2007) (suggesting that the Supreme Court is moving
toward two theories of contributory infringement: "contributory infringement, which is when
a defendant materially contributes to infringement with knowledge of infringement, and
inducement of infringement, which is when a defendant purposefully encourages infringement
in a way that materially contributes to infringement").
69. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934-37 (2005).
70. Id. at 934-35 & n.10; see also Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325,
1336-40 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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TABLE 1 - COMPARISON OF THE TWO TYPES OF CONTRIBUTORY
INFRINGEMENT
Knowing Facilitation

" Satisfied by actual or
constructive knowledge of
the infringement
" For patent and copyright,
safe harbor for supplying
materials capable of
substantial noninfringing
uses

Mental State
Requirement

1-

Contribution
Requirement

" Contribution to
infringement must be
"material"
" Satisfied by manufacturing
or distributing the
infringing product or
directly controlling and
monitoring the
instrumentality used to
infringe
" Unclear what other
activities are "material"

Inducement

" Defendant must
specifically intend
for the direct
infringer to infringe
* Unclear whether
defendant can be
liable if he or she
believes that the
direct infringer's
conduct is legal
" No safe harbor for
supplying materials
capable of
substantial
noninfringing uses
* Unclear whether
"material" standard
of knowing
facilitation applies
or whether a lesser
standard applies

III. COMPARING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONTRIBUTORY
LIABILITY TO CRIMINAL LAW CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
This Part sketches out the basic requirements for liability as a
criminal accomplice and compares those requirements to the criteria
for contributory infringement liability established in Part II.

797

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2009

Accomplice liability demands proof not only of the defendant's
knowledge of someone else's criminal act, but compelling proof that
the defendant intended for that criminal act to occur. By contrast, no
proof of intent is needed for knowing facilitation infringement.
Moreover, contributory infringement doctrine demands evidence of
a significant contribution to the directly infringing activity while
extremely trivial acts can subject a criminal defendant to accomplice
liability.
A. Accomplice LiabilityDoctrine
In his dissent in the Visa case, Judge Kozinski raised the
accomplice liability standards of criminal law as an appropriate
analogy for determining secondary liability standards for intellectual
property. 7 He argued that Visa satisfied the material contribution
threshold because its payment processing service facilitates
infringement in the same manner that the driver of a getaway car or
the financial backer of a drug deal facilitates a criminal transaction."
Like Kozinski, other judges have turned to criminal law analogies to
solve questions of contributory intellectual property liability.73
Meanwhile, Congress continues to expand criminal penalties for
intellectual
property
violations,7 4
demonstrating
increasing
acceptance of importing criminal law concepts to intellectual
property regulation.75 Federal law enforcement agencies have
71. Visa, 494 F.3d at 815 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Venegas-Hernandez v. ACEMLA, 424 F.3d 50, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2005)
(explaining that secondary copyright infringement liability is "a kind of abettor liability" akin
to similar liability in criminal law); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cit.
2003) (analogizing contributory copyright infringement to criminal aiding and abetting); Sims
v. W. Steel Co., 551 F.2d 811, 817 (10th Cir. 1977) (comparing inducer of patent
infringement to an accessory before the fact); Trs. of Colum. Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics
GMBH, 272 F. Supp. 2d 90, 104 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating that Section 271(b) of the Patent
Act "is analogous to a criminal statute imposing liability for one who acts as an accessory
before the fact"); see also Vengegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 196 (1st
Cir. 2004) ("Our decision to open this issue on remand is by analogy to criminal law. A
decision in an infringement suit to increase the statutory rate based on a finding of willfulness,
like an upward departure from a sentencing guideline's range, is a punitive measure meant to
deter.").
74. See The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110403, §§ 201-206 (2008).
75. Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations
on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
167, 172 (2002) (describing "an explosion in recent years in the use of criminal sanctions for
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recently stepped up investigative efforts and filed more cases for
crimes involving intellectual property infringement,76 even shifting
prosecutorial priorities to target the operators of peer-to-peer file
sharing networks.77 Seeing civil penalties as lacking deterrent effect,
states are also enacting more criminal laws designed to safeguard the
interests of intellectual property owners.78 With criminal law
analogues becoming increasingly important to intellectual property
right holders, 79 an examination of the soundness of applying criminal
law secondary liability principles to intellectual property is
appropriate.
Like intellectual property law, criminal law recognizes liability for
the actions of others. The doctrine of "accomplice liability" provides
for the criminal responsibility of one who acts with another in the
perpetration of a crime. 8' The doctrine has a lengthy historical
pedigree. 8 ' It roughly corresponds to contributory liability in
intellectual property offenses"). Legal scholars suggest that the trend towards greater
criminalization of intellectual property rights violations can be attributed to the lobbying
prowess of the entertainment and software industries as well as genuine fears over the
infringing potential of the Internet and global trade. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A
GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 511 (2d ed. 2006); Michael M. DuBose, Criminal
Enforcement of IntellectualPropertyLaws in the Twenty-First Century, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS,
481,482-85 (2006).
76. Daniel Newman et al., IntellectualPropertyCrimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 693, 695
(2007). In recent years, the Department of Justice has realized a fifty percent increase in
convictions for intellectual property offenses. Kim F. Nativadad, Note, Stepping It Up and
Taking It to the Streets: Changing Civil and Criminal Copyright Enforcement Tactics, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 485 (2008).

77. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office W. Dist. of Va., Wise, Virginia Man
Sentenced in Peer-to-Peer Piracy Crackdown
(Oct. 17, 2006), available at
http://wv.usdoj.gov/criminal/ybercrime/stanleySent.htm.
78. See Newman et al., supra note 76, at 695-96; see also William Triplett, FedsDeliver
PiracyConviction, VARIETY, June 29, 2008 (reporting on first jury trial conviction for criminal
copyright infringement for peer-to-peer file sharing).
79. Hogberg, supra note 67, at 943 (discussing application of mens rea requirement in
criminal statutes to contributory copyright infringement).
80. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 17 (6th ed. 1990). Accomplice liability is a particularly
confusing doctrine because it isreferred to by so many different names. Although I use the
term accomplice liability in this Article because it is the most common term for criminal
contributory liability, there are several different terms used in different jurisdictions to describe
a doctrine where a defendant may be convicted of a crime "even though he or she is not the
actual perpetrator of the criminal act." See 21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 162. Alternatively,
the principles of accomplice liability may be referred to as accountability, criminal aider and
abettor liability, joint criminal liability, joint criminal venture, acting in concert, complicity,
and the law of parties. Id.
81. See United States v. Peroni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cit. 1938) (locating the first
judicial recognition of the doctrine in fourteenth century English common law); Grace E.
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intellectual property law, in that, like contributory liability,
accomplice liability looks to the mental state of the defendant as well
as his actions to see if they meet the required standard.8 2 In criminal
law, the requirement that a defendant commit his wrongful act with
knowledge and willfulness is referred to as mens rea.8 3 The
requirement of a particular wrongful act needed to subject the
defendant to liability is referred to as actus reus.84
1. Mens rea
In the majority of cases, accomplice liability requires that it be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has the specific
intent to cause another to commit the underlying crime.8" There are
actually two types of mens rea that can be at stake in accomplice
liability cases. 86 First, the law addresses the mens rea of knowingly
aiding the conduct of another person. For an accomplice liability
conviction in any jurisdiction, the trier of fact must conclude that the
defendant knew that its actions were facilitating the activities of
another.8 7 Inadvertent or unknowing encouragement or assistance
will not subject a party to accomplice liability.88
Second, the law also recognizes the mens rea of having the same
object as the elements of the underlying crime. 89 If the defendant
Mueller, Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S.CAL. L. REv. 2169, 2169 (1988)
("Anglo-American jurisprudence has recognized accomplice liability since its inception.").
82. Also, like intellectual property law, on rare occasions, criminal law imposes vicarious
liability for the acts of others. Unlike intellectual property law, however, vicarious liability in
the criminal context has been strictly limited to those occasions when it is specifically required
by statute, imposes only a mild penalty, and the offense carries no significant moral overtones.
PETER W. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW 277 (2d ed. 2002).
83. United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3d Cir. 1943).
84. LOw, supranote 82, at 266-67.
85. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 579-80 (2d ed.
1986). In some jurisdictions, merely knowingly doing things that help others commit crimes is
enough to subject the party to liability. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-FacilitatingSpeech, 57
95
STAN. L. Rov. 1095, 1174 & n.2
(2005).
86. Moore, supra note 14, at 396; Tyler B. Robinson, Note, A Question of Intent:
Aiding and Abetting Law and the Rule of Accomplice Liability Under § 924(c), 96 MICH. L.
REv. 783, 792 (1997).
87. 2 WAYNE R LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2 (2d ed. 2003).
88. Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 449 (1893); State v. Grebe, 461 S.W.2d 265,
268 (Mo. 1970) (en banc).
89. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2(c) ("The prevailing view is that the accomplice must
also have the mental state required for the crime of which he is to be convicted on an
accomplice theory."); Mueller, supra note 81, at 2169.
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intends to aid or encourage the commission of the direct actor's
crime, then sufficient intent exists to establish accomplice liability.
But if the defendant lacks the same intent to commit a particular
crime as the direct actor, then there usually can be no accomplice
liability.9" For example, in order for an accomplice to be convicted of
the crime of mayhem, which requires a specific intent to maim, it is
not enough for the prosecution to prove intent to aid a battery.
Rather, the prosecution must demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intended for maiming to occur through his
assistance or encouragement to the direct actor.9
Sometimes the defendant may not intend for the crime to
happen but is aware that her conduct facilitates the crime. In two
limited circumstances, this awareness may satisfy the mens rea
requirement. First, courts sometimes permit accomplice liability for
only knowingly, not intentionally, rendering aid if the crime is
especially serious or dangerous.9 2 Knowing but unintentional aid to a
group planning to rob a bank or commit treason may suffice for
accomplice liability.93 But such aid is insufficient for cases involving
gambling,9 4 unlawful sale of alcohol,95 or the majority of other
96
crimes.
Second, in the relatively rare circumstance of those crimes not
requiring proof of either the perpetrator's criminal purpose or
knowledge that his behavior would almost certainly cause the
prohibited result, 97 accomplice liability may be found without
90. United States v. Matos-Quifiones, 456 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2006).
91. Commonwealth v. Hogan, 396 N.E.2d 978,979-80 (Mass. 1979).
92. Low, supra note 82, at 271; CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW
FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 213-14 (2000).

93. Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342, 346-49 (1870) (treason); Regina v. Bainbridge, 1
Q.B. 129, 130-32 (1960) (U.K.) (bank robbery).
94. State ex rel. Dooley v. Coleman, 170 So. 722, 723 (Fla. 1936).
95. Graves v. Johnson, 60 N.E. 383, 383 (Mass. 1901).
96. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06 (1994) (suggesting that the
default rule under the common law is for every crime to require evil intent for the crime to
occur on the part of the defendant); KUTZ, supra note 92, at 213-14; G. Robert Blakey &
Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on
Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM.

L. REv. 1345, 1389-90 (1996) ("The federal courts of appeals now uniformly use 'intent' as
). But see Baruch Weiss, What Were
the necessary state of mind for accomplice liability ....
They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under FederalLaw,

70 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1373 (2002) (contending that some federal courts fail to apply
the intent standard for mens rea for aiding and abetting crimes).
97. KUTZ, supra note 92, at 213-14 ("[A]lmost all felonies require more than mere
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specific intent to facilitate the crime. 98 For accomplice liability to
hold, however, a more limited form of intent must be proven. The
prosecution must show that the defendant intended to commit the
act that facilitated the perpetrator's actions and intended to aid the
perpetrator in the actions that ultimately resulted in the crime. 99 For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that someone
who drove the perpetrator of a killing to the victim's home to
forcibly collect a gambling debt could be found guilty as an
accomplice to reckless manslaughter.' The defense argued that the
mens rea requirement for accomplice liability could not be satisfied
because the defendant was a good friend of the victim and would
never have intended to help the perpetrator kill his friend.'' The
Court disagreed, holding that intent to facilitate a killing is not
required for accomplice liability for reckless manslaughter:
[W]e do not require that the complicitor himself intend to commit
the crime that the principal commits for crimes defined in terms of
recklessness and negligence. In those cases, the complicitor must
only intend to aid or assist the principal to engage in conduct that
"grossly deviates from the standard of reasonable care and poses a
10 2
substantial and unjustifiable risk ofdeath to another.',
Not all courts permit accomplice liability for crimes of recklessness or
negligence, however; some even deem this analytically impossible.0 3
knowledge on the part of [the perpetrator].").
98. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2; Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for
Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
1351, 1368 (1998). For example, a defendant who intended to encourage his brother to
discharge a weapon into a crowd but did not necessarily intend for anyone to die could be
found guilty of second-degree murder when the shot resulted in death. State v. Garnica, 98
P.3d 207, 209-13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). But see, e.g., State v. Etzweiler, 480 A.2d 870, 87475 (N.H. 1984) (holding that it is impossible for someone to be an accomplice to an
unintentional crime), superseded by statute, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626:8 (2001), as
recognized in State v. Anthony, 861 A.2d 773 (2004).
99. Rogers, supra note 98, at 1368.
100. Grissom v. People, 115 P.3d 1280, 1282-85 (Colo. 2005).
101. Id. at 1282.
102. Id. at 1285 (quoting Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 251 (Colo. 1997)).
103. E.g., Etzweiler, 480 A.2d at 874-75; People v. Marshall, 106 N.W.2d 842, 843-44
(Mich. 1961) (no conviction for being an accomplice to vehicular manslaughter); Maughon v.
State, 71 S.E. 922, 926 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911). But see People v. Abbott, 445 N.Y.S.2d 344,
347 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (accomplice convicted for encouraging vehicular manslaughter in
drag racing competition); State v. McVay, 132 A. 436, 439 (RI. 1926). There is also
disagreement on this issue among the limited group of scholars that have studied the question
of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes. See Rogers, supra note 98, at 1371. Some
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Courts are particularly reluctant to find accomplice liability
without specific intent for strict liability crimes." The doctrine is not
uniform from state to state, but the prevailing rule is that even
though the principal charged with a strict liability criminal offense
may be convicted without evidence of a particular mental state, an
accused accomplice will not be liable without proof of intent to
facilitate commission of the strict liability crime.' At the least, proof
must exist that the defendant intended to aid the principal in her
actions. 0 6 Courts typically refuse to apply the doctrine of accomplice
liability to defendants who knowingly but unintentionally aid others
in strict liability crimes."°7 For example, although possessing illegal
machine guns is a strict liability criminal offense, someone will not be
liable as an accomplice to that crime unless there is proof of the
accomplice's "intent to aid" and "desire to bring about the illegal
possession of machine guns."'0 8
Thus, unlike prosecutions for accomplice liability for underlying
intentional crimes, specific intent to facilitate the actual crime itself is
not necessarily required for acting as an accomplice to a crime of
recklessness, negligence, or strict liability, but the accomplice must
intend to aid the proscribed activity. 0 9 Accomplice liability for
involuntary manslaughter provides a good illustration of the
doctrine. Although it is unlikely that someone could possess
sufficient intent for conviction as an accomplice to involuntary
manslaughter when the killing resulted from a sudden and
unpremeditated blow, accomplice liability can exist for involuntary

scholars also disagree as to the consistency of the accomplice liability case law in this area. See
Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369, 372 & n.5
(1997); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed CriminalLiability,93 YALE L.J. 609, 637 n.100 (1984);
Weiss, supra note 96, at 1351 (describing case law on accomplice's required mental state as
"chaos").
104. In general, strict liability criminal offenses are disfavored. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.05 cmt. (1985) (stating that strict liability is per se inappropriate whenever the offense
carries the possibility of probation or imprisonment). Nevertheless, for a very limited number
of crimes, no proof of a culpable mental state is required for conviction of the principal actor.
For example, a business may be criminally liable for distributing misbranded or adulterated
drugs even though it had no knowledge or intent that such distribution would occur. United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
105. LAFAVE, supranote 87, § 13.2(c).
106. Rogers, supra note 98, 1368.
107. LAFAVE, supranote 87, § 13.2(c); Kadish, supranote 12, at 347 n.48.
108. United States v. Lawson, 872 F.2d 179, 181 (6th Cir. 1989).
109. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2(c).
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manslaughter when the killing results from a grossly negligent act
and the accomplice intended to encourage that negligent act. 10° For
example, when a defendant intentionally encouraged a boat's captain
and engineer to use a boiler that the defendant knew was old and
worn, the defendant could be held liable as an accomplice when the
boiler exploded and killed several ship passengers."' Even though
the defendant did not intend to kill the passengers, he did specifically
intend for the old and worn boiler to be used in a manner that put
the passengers at risk." 2
Apart from these two exceptions, which are not always
recognized, the law demands proof that the accused accomplice
subjectively intended for the crime to occur. The requirement of
intent to bring about the underlying criminal act for accomplice
liability has been adopted by all federal circuits,"3 as well as most
state courts." 4 Even when the underlying crime is an unintentional
one or particularly threatening to public safety, an accomplice must
somehow associate himself with the criminal venture and want it to
succeed in order to trigger liability." 5
2. Actus reus
Accomplice liability also requires a particular wrongful deed,
known as actus reus, in order to subject the defendant to liability.
The actus reus of accomplice liability corresponds to the
contribution requirement for contributory infringement. A
defendant is liable for the crime of another if, with the intent to
facilitate the commission of the crime, he "gave assistance or

110. State v.McVay, 132 A. 436, 437-38 (R-I. 1926).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 641 (6th Cir. 1994).
114. E.g., People v. Marshall, 106 N.W.2d 842, 843-44 (Mich. 1961); State v. Gartland,
263 S.W. 165, 170-71 (Mo. 1924). Most state accomplice liability statutes are in agreement,
although some interstate disagreement continues to exist regarding accomplice liability for the
furtherance of negligent acts. See LAFAVE, supranote 87, § 13.2(b). Some jurisdictions permit
a lesser type of liability called "criminal facilitation" for knowingly but unintentionally
rendering aid to a person who intends to commit a crime. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.05
(McKinney 2009).
115. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2(b); e.g., State v. Vincent, 479 A.2d 237, 243 (Conn.
1984) ("An accessory must have both the intent to help the principal and the intent to commit
the crime.").
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encouragement or failed to perform a legal duty to prevent it . . .
,,i16 As one scholar has put it, "To be an accomplice, my act must
have something to do with why, how, or with what ease the legally
prohibited result was brought about by someone else."" 7
Although the accused accomplice must have "something to do"
with the underlying crime, the actus reus requirement is of secondary
importance as compared to the mens rea standard." 8 As one court of
appeals remarked, it "does not take much to satisfy" the actus reus
standard in an accomplice liability case. 1 9 "The most trivial assistance
is sufficient basis to render the secondary actor accountable for the
actions of the primary actor.', 20 "Proof of any form of participation"
is enough to support a conviction for accomplice liability, provided
the requisite mental state has been established. 121 Thus, relatively
unimportant acts of assistance like preparing a meal for the
perpetrator,122 taking care of the perpetrator's child while he
116. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.2; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (1985). In the
past, accomplice liability actually referred to three separate types of liability. A "principal in the
second degree" provided aid to the actual perpetrator and was "present" at the commission of
the crime. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 860 (3d ed. 1996);
LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.1. An "accessory before the fact" was someone who aided the
actual perpetrator in committing the felony but was not actually present at the scene. KAPLAN
ET AL., supra; LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 13.1. An "accessory after the fact" did not aid the
perpetrator in committing the crime, but did assist him in avoiding capture afterwards.
KAPLAN ET AL., supra at 861. The complexity inherent in categorizing contributory behavior
into these three different types of liability eventually caused most jurisdictions to abandon the
three distinctions in accomplice liability. Now, except for accessories after the fact, "all parties
to the crime face prosecution for the substantive crime itself and thus face the same
punishment or range of punishments." Id.
117. Moore, supra note 14, at 401.
118. Joshua Dressier, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability:
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 102 (1985); Robinson, supra note 86,
at 793.
119. United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cit. 2000) (quoting United States
v. Woods, 148 F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d
711, 722 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The requirement that one who aids and abets a crime must
contribute to its success should not be understood too literally .....
120. Dressier, supra note 118, at 102.
121. State v. Gonzalez-Gongora, 673 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); see also
Cannon v. State, 904 P.2d 89, 100 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("Only slight participation is
needed to change a person's status from mere spectator to aider and abettor.");
Commonwealth v. Savage, 695 A.2d 820, 825 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) ("An accomplice must
have done something to participate in the venture. However, the least degree of concert or
collusion in the commission of the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as
an accomplice.") (quoting Commonwealth v. Calderini, 611 A.2d 206, 207-08 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992)).
122. Alexander v. State, 102 So. 597, 598 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925).
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commits the underlying crime,' 23 lending the perpetrator a shirt,' 24
or even being present and applauding the perpetrator's criminal
act12 5 can satisfy the actus reus standard.
One question the courts have wrestled with is whether an
accused accomplice may be convicted for selling goods to a buyer in
the ordinary course of business when the retailer is aware that the
buyer intends to use the goods to commit a crime. 26 By and large, a
seller of retail goods that provides materials for a crime may be held
liable as an accomplice. 27 As one court explained, "One who sells a
gun to another knowing that he is buying it to commit a murder,
would hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the murder by
showing that he received full price for the gun .. ,,128 What is
essential is a determination that the retailer had the required mens
rea, i.e., intent to sell the instrumentality for use in a criminal
endeavor.
The case law governing retail sales of instruments used to
accomplish crimes demonstrates the lax standards courts apply in
determining whether the actus reus for accomplice liability has been
satisfied. Courts typically assume that a defendant's selling an
instrumentality used to commit a crime is sufficient to satisfy the
actus reus requirement.' 2 9 While proof of some affirmative act is
required so that the law does not punish the accomplice for mere
thoughts in sympathy with the commission of a crime, 3 0 the
123. State v. Duran, 526 P.2d 188, 188-89 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).
124. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 677-78 (1978) (recounting a
German case where the court found that the defendant's lending a smock to his friend so that
he would not stain his clothes while beating someone up was sufficient for accomplice
liability).
125. See Wilcox v. Jeffery, [1951] 1 All ER. 464 (K.B.) (U.K.).
126. Rogers, supra note 98, at 1358; Candace Courteau, Comment, The Mental Element
Requiredfor Accomplice Liability: A Topic Note, 59 LA. L. REV. 325, 345 (1998).
127. In some states, the retailer will be punished as an accomplice while in others, the
retailer is liable but under a separate criminal statute for "knowing facilitation," which carries a
reduced penalty. Mueller, supra note 81, at 2187.
128. Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940).
129. See e.g., id. ("[T]hose who make a profit by furnishing to criminals, whether by sale
or otherwise, the means to carry on their nefarious undertakings aid them just as truly as if they
were actual partners with them .... ");Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 462 A.2d 573,
588-90 (N.J. 1983) (allowing criminal prosecution for sale of drug paraphernalia with
knowledge of purchaser's intent to use with controlled substances).
130. For accomplice liability, there must be some action that demonstrates that the
defendant expressly or impliedly gave her assent to the underlying crime. State v. Burgess, 96
S.E.2d 54, 57-59 (N.C. 1957).
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determination of whether the accomplice had the intent to
contribute to the criminal act is the essential piece of the accomplice
liability puzzle, not actus reus.' 3 ' When retailers are charged as
accomplices, the cases often boil down to one central question: the
retailer's intent. 32 In essence, accomplice liability is designed to
punish the accomplice for his intent to contribute, not for his actions
in furtherance of the principal's crime.' 33
B. Comparisonwith ContributoryInfringementDoctrine
As it stands currently, contributory infringement law does not
require the strong showings of intent required for accomplice
liability in criminal law. Specific intent to facilitate a crime is usually
required for accomplice liability.' 34 By contrast, intent to bring about
the ultimate act of infringement is only necessary for inducement
infringement liability, not for knowing facilitation infringement.
Moreover, while both contributory liability doctrines allow the
defendant's mental state to be inferred through circumstantial
evidence, infringement law takes a comparatively generous approach
in determining what evidence is probative of knowledge of the
underlying illegal act. Most importantly, accomplice liability places
little stock in the actus reus requirement while contributory
infringement decisions often hinge on whether the defendant's
actions were "material" enough to justify liability.
These are important doctrinal differences. Mental states that

131. Weiss, supra note 96, at 1347-48 ("Because virtually any act of assistance, no matter
how insubstantial, satisfies the 'act' element ... the mental element is really what defines the
aider and abettor.").
132. In Kalem Co. v. HarperBros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911), a case involving contributory
copyright infringement, Justice Holmes provided some background on retailer liability as
criminal accomplices:
In some cases where an ordinary article of commerce is sold nice
questions may arise as to the point at which the seller becomes an
accomplice in a subsequent illegal use by the buyer. It has been held that
mere indifferent supposition or knowledge on the part of the seller that
the buyer of spirituous liquor in contemplating such unlawful use is not
enough to connect him with the possible unlawful consequences but that
if the sale was made with a view to the illegal resale, the price could not
be recovered.
Id. at 62-63.
133. Robinson, supra note 86, at 793 ("[I]t is the principal's commission of the offense,
and not the acts of assistance or influence, for which the accomplice is punished.").
134. SeesupraPart II.A.1.
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would be insufficient to trigger criminal accomplice liability are
sufficient for purposes of contributory infringement liability. A
defendant may be liable for contributory infringement without proof
that she intended for the direct actor to infringe. 3 ' On the other
hand, the prosecution in an accomplice liability case must
demonstrate that the defendant had the specific intent to cause the
underlying crime to be committed." 6 Thus, someone who helped
the direct actor falsify corporate records could not be held liable as
an accessory for the direct actor's filing of a fraudulent tax return
based on those records without evidence that the defendant
"contemplated" the filing of the fraudulent returns.' 3 7 Giving
assistance with mere "knowledge of the perpetrator's general
criminal purpose" is not enough; there must be proof of intent to
further the perpetrator's particular crime.' 3 8
By contrast, contributory infringement defendants can be held
liable even if they had no specific knowledge that infringement was
taking place. For example, a defendant accused of knowing
facilitation of trademark infringement will be liable for failing to take
precautionary measures if it can be reasonably expected to know that
someone is using its product to infringe.' 39 Thus, the manufacturer

135. See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cit. 2005) (where the defendant "had the intent to induce the specific
acts constituting infringement, intent additionally to cause an infringement can be presumed");
see also Hogberg, supra note 67, at 950-51 (contrasting the specific intent requirement for
inducement infringement liability with the lack of such a requirement for standard
contributory infringement liability). Direct infringement of intellectual property rights is a
strict liability offense. One may be directly liable for trademark, copyright, or patent
infringement without having any knowledge or intent that the infringement took place. See 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000) (trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000) (copyrights); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (2000) (patents); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, FairUse Harbors,93
VA. L. REv. 1483, 1497 (2007) ("U.S. copyright law ostensibly establishes a standard of strict
liability; the mental state of a putative infringer is irrelevant to the issue of direct liability.
Courts have interpreted liability under the Copyright Act very broadly, ruling that it requires
neither intent nor knowledge, thus making even unconscious copying actionable."); Roger D.
Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability in Intellectual
Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1999) ("Because patent infringement [like copyright
and trademark infringement] is a strict liability tort, the patentee may enjoin the unauthorized
manufacture, use, or sale of the invention, regardless of the infringer's state of mind.").
136. See supra Part II.A.1.
137. People v. Weiss, 256 A.D. 162, 163 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939), ajfd 21 N.E.2d 212
(N.Y. 1939).
138. People v. Baldera, 711 P.2d 480, 508 (Cal. 1985).
139. Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 985 (D. Mass.
1946); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (citing Snow
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of "Polar Cola" could be liable for trademark infringement if it
should have expected that bars purchasing its product were
substituting "Polar Cola" when customers ordered "Coke."' 4 ° The
mental state requirement for knowing facilitation of copyright
infringement is similar. Intent to facilitate infringement is not
required. Instead, the standard for the knowledge requirement is
objective. Courts ask if the defendant had "constructive knowledge"
or "apparent knowledge" of the infringing activity. 1 ' By holding
contributory defendants to an objective standard, contributory
infringement doctrine encourages businesses to adopt reasonable
precautions when engaging in transactions affecting intellectual
property and discourages businesses from intentionally avoiding
evidence of infringement.'4 2
Another significant difference between the two indirect liability
doctrines can be found in the way courts interpret evidence of
mental state. For contributory liability of intellectual property
infringement, knowledge of the direct actor's infringing activity can
be inferred from ambiguous evidence.' 43 For example, knowledge of
copyright infringement was "imputed to an advertising agency
because its client, the direct infringer, exhibited the 'well known
indicia of the fly-by-night operator--smallness, lack of permanent
location, and financial unreliability' . . . .,... In addition, knowledge
will be imputed for purposes of contributory trademark liability
when a defendant landowner has reason to suspect that a vendor is
selling infringing goods on its property. 4
Courts have begun to rely on new types of evidence to satisfy the
knowledge requirement. According to recent decisions, an indirect
financial benefit from the direct copyright infringer's conduct is
evidence of a culpable mental state. For example, in Grokster, in

Crestwith approval).
140. Coca-ColaCo., 64 F. Supp. at 985.
141. Cable/Home Commc'ns Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 846 (11th
Cir. 1990); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Softvare Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262 (5th Cir. 1988).
142. 5 PATRY, supra note 1, § 21:47.
143. See Craig A. Grossman, The Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability and
ContributoryInfringement: From Interstitial Gap Filler to Arbiter of the Content Wars, 58
S.M.U. L. REV. 357, 373, 383-84 (2005).
144. Id. (quoting Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399,404 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
145. Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149
(7th Cit. 1992).
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determining whether the mental state requirement for contributory
liability was met, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Grokster's
business model, pointing out that because Grokster relied on
advertising to turn a profit from its free file-sharing service, it
received a financial benefit as more users joined its network and it
could charge more for advertising.' 4 6 The Court reasoned that
because the vast majority of activity on the network involved
infringement of copyrighted works, Grokster's business model
depended on infringement and such a business model was powerful
evidence that a court could rely on in imputing knowledge of the
direct infringers' conduct.' 4 7 In addition, particularly in the online
context, courts read a business's failure to take prophylactic measures
against downstream infringement as evidence of a culpable mental
state. For example, the Seventh Circuit held a file-sharing service
liable, in part, because the service did not demonstrate that it would
have been disproportionately costly to employ a filtering device to
prevent illegal downloading of copyrighted content.'4 8 Other
contributory infringement decisions have relied on a defendant's
failure to implement technological safeguards as evidence of a guilty
mind."'
Criminal law, however, takes the mens rea requirement quite
seriously and the state faces a heavy burden of proof in
demonstrating the defendant's culpable state of mind. Although
circumstantial evidence can be used to determine the mens rea for
accomplice liability,' the courts are selective as to what evidence
warrants an inference of intent to facilitate the crime of another. Not

146. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 912, 939-40 (2005). Although the
Court contended that it was articulating a standard for the inducement type of contributory
infringement, it seems that its reasoning should also apply to knowing facilitation
infringement. Given the inducement doctrine's requirement of a specific intent to infringe, any
evidence probative of a culpable mental state in that context should also be probative in the
context of knowing facilitation infringement.
147. Id.
148. In reAimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003).
149. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 939; Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 2005 WL
936882, at *6-*7 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 21, 2005); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
487 F.3d 701, 728 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that "a service provider's knowing failure to
prevent infringing actions could be the basis for imposing contributory liability"); Tiffany, Inc.
v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding internet auctioneer not
contributorily liable for trademark infringement, in part because of the technological measures
it undertook to prevent counterfeiting).
150. See Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 629 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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only must the prosecution demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant intended to facilitate the underlying criminal act,
but criminal law courts are loathe to find the mens rea requirement
satisfied from speculative evidence. Take, for example, the case of a
defendant charged with aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in
kidnapping.' Although there was uncontroverted evidence that a
passenger riding in the defendant's car pointed a gun at the
defendant's ex-girifriend's current boyfriend, causing the boyfriend
to flee, that the defendant took advantage of the situation by
grabbing his ex-girlfriend and placing her in his vehicle, that he
immediately drove with her to the U.S.-Mexico border, and that he
threatened to kill her if she revealed the kidnapping to the
authorities, the Ninth Circuit overturned a conviction for aiding and
abetting. 52 Despite this evidence, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
it was possible for a jury to find that the defendant did not
"consciously and intentionally" assist the passenger in using a firearm
to kidnap his ex-wife.' Similarly, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
refused to find a defendant indirectly liable for trafficking in
methamphetamines even though it was demonstrated that the
defendant tried to shoplift over 500 tablets of over-the-counter
medication
containing
the
ingredients
for
making
methamphetamine, that another party had offered to purchase these
tablets from the defendant, and that the defendant had sold this
medication to the same party in the past with knowledge that it
would be used to make methamphetamines. 5 4 Although seemingly
strong evidence existed suggesting that the defendant possessed the
required mindset, both courts concluded that more evidence was
needed before the defendant could be liable as an accomplice.'
151. United States v. Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1997).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. State v. Maldanado, 114 P.3d 379, 380-82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005).
155. See also Gains v. State, 417 So. 2d 719, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (the driver of
a getaway car avoided liability for armed robbery, even though he led police on a chase away
from the scene of the robbery, because the court deemed the proof insufficient to prove that
the driver was "a knowing participant in the crime"); People v. Burrel, 235 N.W. 170, 170-71
(Mich. 1931) (court refused to convict the driver of a car as an accomplice to statutory rape
even though he drove the car onto a dark street, parked the car, and "sat in the front seat with
arms over the steering wheel and his head resting on his arms" while the rape occurred in the
back seat); People v. Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d 1060 (N.Y. 2003) (evidence that the defendant lay
in wait with the perpetrator of a murder to attack the victim was insufficient to find the mens
rea necessary for an accomplice liability conviction under a New York statute for "depraved
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Finally, as it stands today, contributory infringement doctrine
requires a rigorous analysis of the contribution requirement.
Although the doctrine has not defined exactly what makes a
contribution "material," courts analyze this requirement with great
care. In the Visa case, the knowledge standard was not even
evaluated as the court battled only over whether or not Visa
materially contributed to the infringing behavior."5 6 By contrast, the
contribution requirement for accomplice liability can be satisfied by
innocuous actions and means little in comparison with the mens rea
requirement." 7 Table 2 below summarizes the differences between
accomplice liability and current contributory infringement doctrine.

indifference murder").
156. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007).
157. See supra Part III.A.2.
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TABLE 2 - COMPARISON OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY

Mental State
Requirement

Accomplice Liability

Contributory Infringement
Liability

" For most criminal acts,
mens rea requires that
contributory defendant
specifically intend to
facilitate crime
M Courts reluctant to
speculate as to state of

9 No proof of intent to facilitate
infringement needed for
knowing facilitation
infringement
* Circumstantial evidence
generously interpreted,
including failure to install anti-

defendant's mind

infringement safeguards and
receipt of a financial benefit
from infringement

Contribution
Requirement

" Actus reus requirement
is minimal, does not

e Rigorous requirement that can
exempt defendant from liability

require causation
* May be satisfied by
conduct unessential to
the criminal activity,
including provision of
food, clothing, child
care, or applause for the
perpetrator

even if mental state
requirement has been satisfied
e Contours of requirement
remain unclear
* Courts rely at various times on
"control;" provision of site,
services, or components for
infringement; "directness" of
defendant's relationship with
actual infringer

Given these significant differences between contributory
infringement law and accomplice liability, Judge Kozinski's appeal to
criminal law analogies makes little sense. In making the argument
that the material assistance prong for contributory copyright and
trademark liability simply turns on whether the conduct substantially
assists the infringement, not on what he argued were superfluous
distinctions made by the majority, Judge Kozinksi pointed to
examples from accomplice liability. He explained that criminal courts
have no problem in finding that those who knowingly lend money to
drug dealers or drive a principal to the scene of a crime are
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substantially contributing to criminal activity.158 By offering these
criminal law analogies, Judge Kozinski implied that criminal law and
intellectual property law apply the same standards in determining
what indirect activities are sufficient to trigger liability for the legal
violations of another.' 59 But accomplice liability standards largely
omit rigorous consideration of the actus reus requirement. Instead,
the defendant's actions are only an afterthought once the mens rea
requirement has been satisfied. By contrast, contributory
infringement law places great emphasis on the material contribution
requirement. Thus, intellectual property and criminal law differ
dramatically as to what activities are sufficient to result in indirect
liability. 160 While criminal contributory liability demands a higher
degree of mental culpability and greater proof of that culpability than
contributory infringement, intellectual property doctrine places a
higher burden on the plaintiff to satisfy the contribution
requirement. The next part addresses whether contributory
infringement doctrine should be revised to match the standards for
accomplice liability.
IV. WHY THE ANALOGY BETWEEN ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT FAILS

Many scholars have tried to find an underlying unity in both civil
and criminal law.' 61 In Anglo-American law, both legal doctrines
share a common origin with tort law being derived from early
158. Visa, 494 F.3d at 815.
159. Id.
160. A somewhat different calculation is involved in construing the scope of statutes
imposing criminal liability for infringement. The No Electronic Theft Act, 17 U.S.C. §
506(a)(2), and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05, provide
criminal penalties for certain acts of copyright infringement. To determine if certain acts of
encouragement or facilitation trigger these criminal sanctions, a court would need to consult
traditional criminal accomplice liability standards. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of
CopyrightInfringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and CriminalTheory, 83 B.U.
L. REv. 731, 743 (2003). While imposition of criminal liability for certain intellectual property
crimes has proved controversial, see id. at 733 (maintaining that it is unacceptable to treat
copyright infringement for personal use as a crime); Green, supra note 75, at 241 (stating that
criminal penalties for intellectual property infringement seem out of place); I. Trotter Hardy,
Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 340-41 (2002)
("Unfortunately, though, the 'social attractiveness' of greater criminalization may only be
apparent to legislators, law enforcement agencies, and those industries that depend on owning
and protecting copyrights."), this Article is concerned with the use of accomplice liability
analogies to determine the scope of the civil doctrine of contributory infringement.
161. Hall, supra note 9, at 753.
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English criminal law. 62 Both bodies of law use many of the same
terms (e.g., assault, battery, conspiracy, fraud, defamation, and
trespass).' 6 3 A single action by a defendant may give rise to both
criminal and tort suits." Such commonalities led Oliver Wendell
Holmes to conclude that, "the general principles of criminal law and
civil liability are the same. '
Nevertheless, the differences between criminal law and the law of
another discrete set of legal wrongs, intellectual property
infringement, are more striking than the similarities. Just because
courts are willing to hold babysitters, cooks, and those who applaud
illegal activity liable as criminal accomplices, this does not mean that
the bar for material contribution should be set at the same level in
the context of civil infringement. In this Part, I discuss why
accomplice liability principles are a poor fit for contributory
infringement.
Secondary liability doctrines determine responsibility in different
ways. In ancient times, contributory liability often depended on the
defendant's physical presence during another's wrongful act.' 66 Some
of the more modern doctrines, like vicarious liability, assess
responsibility on the basis of the defendant's relationship with the
direct actor, regardless of the defendant's knowledge or participation
in the wrongful activity.' 67 Unless the defendant and the direct actor
fall into one of three relationships-master and servant, principal and
agent, or employer and independent contractor-the defendant
cannot be vicariously liable in tort. 6 Similarly, under the doctrine of
conspiracy, a defendant may become liable for the actions of another
by joining in a complicit relationship with other wrongful actors. 6 9
162. Nathan Isaacs Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability,58 VAND. L. REV.
241, 250 (2005).
163. See, e.g., Keyzer v. Amerlink, Ltd., 618 S.E.2d 768, 773 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005),
affd 627 S.E.2d 462 (N.C. 2006) (explaining that "exclusivity of possession" is the basis for
both civil and criminal trespass actions); 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §
381 (10th ed. 2006) (recognizing that in tort actions for assault and battery, the California
courts assume that criminal code definitions of "assault" and "battery" are applicable).
164. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 33
(2004).
165. OLIVERWENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 44 (1881).
166. John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts-Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV.
315, 322 (1894).
167. ATIYAH, supranote 11, at 3.
168. Id.
169. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also IZHAK
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Other civil law doctrines impose liability, without a particular
relationship requirement, when the defendant stands to benefit from
the loss attributable to the direct actor's behavior.1 7 °
Criminal law determines the liability of accomplices by measuring
the nexus between the accomplice's mental state and the ultimate
criminal action. Unless the accomplice specifically intends for the
perpetrator's criminal behavior to occur, there is no liability. The
nexus requirement furthers the retributive goals of criminal law by
ensuring that the defendant unambiguously endorses the
perpetrator's criminal activity. Such an approach to contributory
liability is not available in the context of intellectual property,
however. Evidentiary hurdles and theoretical differences between
intellectual property and criminal law demand a separate
methodology for determining contributory infringement. In Part V,
I propose that contributory infringement liability be grounded on a
different metric: causation. Before suggesting a new method for
analyzing these types of intellectual property cases, however, the
following material explains why accomplice liability doctrine cannot
cure what ails contributory infringement law.
A. Accomplice Liability'sNexus Between Defendant'sMental State
and the IllegalAction
When multiple actors participate in the same socially undesired
enterprise, the law must determine when an actor is sufficiently
involved to face legal consequences. Criminal law assesses liability by
examining the strength of the link between the mental state of the
actor and the ultimate illegal act. For the actual perpetrator of the
illegal act, this is a relatively easy question. Assuming that the
perpetrator intends his actions, the link between the perpetrator's
mental state and the ultimate illegal act is as strong as it can be.
Things get trickier when a court must analyze the nexus between
the defendant's mental state and an illegal act committed by another
party. It is unlikely that there is a complete overlap between the
mental state of the secondary party and the illegal action performed
by the direct actor. People participating in group activity rarely
ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 175 (1993) (discussing the use of "special
relationships" in tort law to impose a duty of particular persons to prevent deliberate acts of
wrongdoing by another).
170. See Fleming James, Jr., Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L.
REV. 293, 297 (1958).
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171
organize in perfect unanimity towards identical shared goals.
Individuals may agree to work together, but each brings their own
expectations, intuitions, and motivations to the project.
Nevertheless, accomplice liability doctrine mandates a tight nexus
between the defendant's mindset and the ultimate crime. As
discussed above, unless the defendant specifically intends for the
criminal act to take place (or at least intends for the direct actor to
behave in a way that is practically
certain to lead to the criminal act),
72
there is usually no liability.
The justification for requiring such a tight nexus between the
defendant's mental state and the act of another lies in the animating
philosophy behind criminal sanctions. Historically, the primary
justification for criminal punishment has been the theory of
retribution, 73 which theorizes that criminal law exists to punish
morally inappropriate behavior.' 74 Under retributivist theory, the
state sets limits on freedom of action according to moral concerns. 175
The social norms of the community shape the boundaries of criminal
conduct. 176 Criminal punishment serves a civic purpose by expressing
the state's indignation and disapproval of the defendant's conduct
1 77
and vindicating the victim's autonomous rights in life or property.
Under retributivist theory, accomplice liability is designed to
punish those who unmistakably support the same criminal act as the
178
perpetrator even if they do not commit the act themselves.

171. KUTZ, supra note 92, at 90.
172. See supra Part III.A.1.
173. Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437,
450 (characterizing this as the "prevailing view among criminal law theorists for a half-century
or more").
174. Moohr, supra note 160, at 748; see also H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 395 (2d ed. 1985) (describing retribution as "the principle that the
severity of punishment is to be measured by the wickedness of the criminal").
175. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
81-82 (1883) ("The criminal law thus proceeds upon the principle that it is morally right to
hate criminals, and it confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals
punishments which express it."); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of
Property,48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1885 (2007) ("[W]e usually think of criminal law as
condemning acts that are regarded as unambiguously immoral.").
176. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 420
(1999) (explaining the difference between illegal theft and legal competition as their placement
"against the background of social norms").
177. JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function ofPunishment, in DOING AND DESERVING:
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 98, 100-05 (1970).

178.

See Mueller, supra note 81, at 2173 (explaining that "[d]esert is calculated by the
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Whether it is choosing to encourage or aid a robbery,179 the beating
of a child,180 or a dangerous drag race,' 8 ' the accomplice, although
not committing the actual crime, expresses his mental agreement
with an act that violates accepted social norms and disrespects the
value of the victim's life. By expressing a reason for his conduct that
undervalues the welfare of others, the accomplice signals that his
views offend established social codes and warrant punishment.' 82
Criminal liability for complicit behavior furthers the law's retributive
goals by holding accountable those whose deeds reflect an
unacceptable lack of respect for the welfare of others, even if they do
not commit the disrespectful action themselves.' 83
Probably the best example in literature of a person deserving of
moral condemnation, and hence criminal sanction, for contributing
to a crime is Iago in Othello.'84 Although Othello is the direct actor
who murders his wife, Desdemona, Iago manipulates Othello and
several others with misleading statements and planted evidence to
orchestrate that result. Accomplice liability will only be found when
there is unmistakable proof of tight overlap between the mental state
of the accomplice and the ultimate criminal act. lago clearly satisfies
this standard. 8 ' He advises Othello on exactly how to kill
Desdemona.' 8 6 In his soliloquies to the audience, he makes clear that
his behavior is completely voluntary. In fact, what is so chilling about
Iago is that there are no outside forces propelling his efforts to ruin
Othello and kill Desdemona.' 87 He is consumed with malice, but for
no discernable reason. The malice is entirely of his own making. He
level ofculpability involved in the crime, and culpability is tied to the criminal's mental state");
Aimee D. Borromeo, Comment, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, 3 LOy. J. PUB.
INT. L. 175, 186-88 (2002) (discussing mental state required for retributive punishment).
179. State v. Sam, 907 A.2d 99, 113-15 (Conn. App. 2006).
180. State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 786-87 (N.C. 1982).
181. State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608, 614-17 (Iowa 1982).
182. Guyora Binder, The Culpabilityof Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 965,
1034-35 (2008).
183. See KUTZ, supranote 92, at 139 ("Responses are warranted to what we do and who
we are, not because of some deep metaphysics of causal responsibility, but because of what our
actions and gestures of repair indicate about the view we take of our relations with others.").
184. See People v. McCoy, 24 P.3d 1210, 1216-17 (Cal. 2001) (using the example of
the Iago character to illustrate principles of accomplice liability for homicide).
185. Kadish, supranote 12, at 365 ("lago's actions leave no doubt what his game is.").
186. lago tells Othello: "Do it not with poison, strangle her in her bed." WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
187.
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holds himself above society's norms and acts strictly out of self
interest.' 8 8 This is made most clear at the end of the play when he
not only brings about Desdemona's murder at Othello's hand, but
kills his wife, Emilia, and his patron, Roderigo, without remorse. 89
Thus, Iago shows that he is completely indifferent to human
welfare. 190 This is what makes him deserving of retributive
punishment.' 9 ' In assessing accomplice liability, criminal law looks to
whether the accomplice's behavior transgressed moral boundaries.
Although perhaps not always as deserving of retribution as the evil
Iago, culpable accomplices typically demonstrate disrespect for
human life or dignity. A defendant that feeds ammunition to
someone shooting into a crowd is an accomplice to reckless
endangerment. 92 A street drag racer exhibits sufficient disrespect for
human life that he becomes an accomplice to the reckless vehicular
assault committed by his drag racing opponent. 93 When an actor
embarks on a plan of action that potentially involves the use of
deadly force by another, she "crosse[s] a moral divide" that subjects
her, as an accomplice, to derivative liability for the deadly actions of
others. I9'
The immoral aspect of accomplice liability lies not in the act
itself, but in the intentional choice to do a social wrong.' 9' There is
no way to determine if someone has transgressed moral boundaries
without conducting a vigorous examination of the defendant's
mindset. If our shared morality is largely based on the notion that
individuals must display sufficient concern for the welfare of

188. FAITH NOSTBAKEN, UNDERSTANDING
ROSENBERG, THE MASKS OF OTHELLO 174 (1992).

OTHELLO

193

(2000);

MARVIN

189. SHAKESPEARE, supranote 186, act 5, sc. 2.
190. See JANE ADAMSON, OTHELLO AS TRAGEDY: SOME PROBLEMS OF JUDGMENT AND
FEELING 72 (1980).

191. Id. at 100.
192. State v. Garnica, 98 P.3d 207, 209 (Ariz. App. 2004).
193. People v. Hart, 778 N.Y.S.2d 94,96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
194. United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
195. Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319, 320
(1996) (Culpability occurs when one "choose[s] to do a wrong in circumstances when that
choice is freely made."). Similarly, through prosecution for attempted but unsuccessful crimes,
criminal law permits punishment based on a defendant's possession of the required mental
state even if the ultimate wrongful act remains uncompleted. See LAFAVE, supra note 87, §
11.3. Punishment for attempt is not allowed, however, based on mental state alone. For
conviction, the accused must have taken a "substantial step" towards completion of the crime.
Id. § 11.4; see United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 106, 114-15 (2007).
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others,'9 6 no punishment is possible unless the defendant
demonstrates insufficient concern for his fellow citizens.'9 7 The nexus
requirement evaluates the inner workings of the defendant's mind,
probing for expressions of agreement with the perpetrator's criminal
behavior that warrant retributive punishment.
The requirement of significant overlap between the accomplice's
mental state and the underlying illegal act can leave many secondary
parties exempt from legal regulation. The case of Iago is an easy one.
We know from his monologues that he is an instigator, seeking the
death of Desdemona and Othello's ruin. Even though he does not
murder Desdemona himself, we know that he desired and planned
for that act to happen.'9 8 The nexus between lago's mental state and
the wrongful act of Desdemona's murder is tight. In contrast to the
reader's ability to confidently judge and condemn lago, however, the
criminal justice system normally does not have access to lengthy
confessional soliloquies to determine the exact mental state of an
accomplice liability defendant.'9 9 Without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and to a "moral certainty" of a culpable mental state, there
can be no accomplice liability."' 0 Given this high threshold for
liability, accused accomplices may often avoid criminal liability in
situations where it may seem reasonable to infer the defendant's evil
intent."'
This high threshold is a calculated policy choice.20 2 In order to
protect individual autonomy interests, accomplice liability doctrine
demands a strictly-defined shared overlap of criminal intent between
the accomplice and the perpetrator. In the criminal context, the law
cannot tolerate false positives, i.e., convictions of innocent
196. See Matthew 7:12 (King James) ("Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that
men should do to you, do ye even to them."); Analects of Confucius 15:3 ("What you do not
wish upon yourself, extend not to others."); Last Sermon of Muhammad ("Hurt no one so that
no one may hurt you.").
197. See VICTOR TADROS, ACT, AGENCY, AND INDIFFERENCE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 83 (2005).

198. See SHAKESPEARE, supranote 186, act. 5, sc. 2.
199. Cf KUTZ, supra note 92, at 207 (discussing difficulties of determining intent in
criminal cases).
200. Kelly v. State, 139 So. 2d 326, 329 (Ala. 1962).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 151-56.
202. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Justice
Harlan noted that he "view[s] the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.").
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defendants." 3 Requiring specific intent to further the perpetrator's
crime makes sense given the restraint needed in the imposition of
criminal sanctions. Criminal penalties are supposed to be a "last
resort" because they subject defendants to social stigma not present
in civil damage awards. 4 A tight nexus serves retributive interests by
limiting the imposition of state-sanctioned suffering to those
secondary actors that truly intend for immoral activity to occur. 0 '

203. Cf David L. Faigman, Judges as 'Amateur Scientists," 86 B.U.L. REV. 1207, 1215
(2006) (explaining that the reasonable doubt standard is employed for situations where the law
seeks to minimize false positives).
204. Green, supra note 75, at 228, 230; see also KUTZ, supra note 92, at 208 (explaining
that any criminal law system must be structured to avoid false positives because "nothing can
repair the violence done to one's sense of autonomy and worth by unjust punishment");
Roberto Galbiati & Nuno Garoupa, Keeping Stigma out of Administrative Law: An
Explanation of Consistent Beliefs, 15 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 273, 273 (2007) (explaining that
the stigma of an adverse adjudication is greater in the criminal context, with its higher standard
of proof, than in the administrative context).
205. Kadish, supranote 12, at 398 (indicating that the nexus requirement for accomplice
liability is necessary to avoid an undesirable expansion of criminal liability). After retribution,
the other prevailing justification for criminal punishment is deterrence. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth,
Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 17-18 (2005)
(referring to retribution and deterrence as the two dominant contemporary criminal law
theories). In contrast to retributivists, deterrence-based theorists are often uncomfortable with
finding an explicit basis for criminal sanctions in normative judgments as to what is right and
wrong. Binder, supra note 182, at 1000. Instead, they justify criminal penalties as a means to
prevent conduct that is harmful to others. Moohr, supra note 160, at 749. The nexus
requirement also serves deterrent interests in that it incarcerates those who completely
sympathize with criminal behavior and thus may be likely to act criminally themselves in the
future.
Yet, even under a deterrence-based conception of criminal law, liability must be
determined in some way based on social norms and shared moral values, not merely on the
potential for harm. After all, some actions that result in harm to others are deemed socially
beneficial. See State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1997) (holding that a
homeowner may use deadly force to prevent a burglar from taking her real or personal
property); State v. Haley, 667 P.2d 560, 563 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the necessity
defense absolves a defendant for illegal actions that were necessary to prevent a threat of bodily
harm). Similarly, facilitating the infliction of bodily harm violates social norms in some
situations, but not in others. A bystander may encourage a potential victim to defend herself
with violent force yet not face criminal accomplice liability. See Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as
Justification, Not Excuse, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1317, 1329 (2006) (explaining self-defense
according to utilitarian theory). A military subordinate who aids in a violent act may escape
liability under a defense of obedience to superior orders. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). To decide which acts of assistance to those
who commit violence should be exempted from liability, deterrence advocates must ask some
of the same questions as retributivists. Without an "evil mind" that satisfies the mens rea
requirement, there can be no accomplice liability because the defendant has not expressed a
sentiment that clashes with established moral principles. LAFAVE, supra note 87, § 1.2, at 8; see
also Mueller, supra note 81, at 2173 (explaining that "[d]esert is calculated by the level of
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B. Difficulties in Applying the Nexus Requirement to Contributory
Infringement
For three reasons, it does not make sense to require the same
tight nexus between the defendant's mental state and the illegal
activity of another in the infringement context. First, intellectual
property disputes present evidentiary difficulties typically not found
in criminal cases. In both contexts, intent may be determined
through circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact may impute an
intent to commit robbery based on the accomplice's presence in the
getaway car2 °6 or intent to facilitate patent infringement based on the
contributory defendant's prior unsuccessful attempts to obtain a
license from the patent holder.2 °7 Making inferences from such
evidence in the intellectual property context, however, is more
difficult and less appropriate. Transactions between contributors and
direct infringers are often conducted over a distance and through
multiple intermediaries.20 8 As the connection between the
contributor and direct infringer becomes more tenuous, it becomes
more difficult to ascertain the contributor's attitude towards the
direct infringer's conduct. The availability of ambiguous defenses to
infringement, such as fair use, can further cloud attempts to discern
the intent of the contributor.2 °9 If it is unclear whether the direct
infringer believed that her conduct was fair use, then it will be
doubly unclear whether the once-removed contributor believed that
as well.
This assessment of mental state is further complicated because
contributory infringement defendants are typically businesses while
accomplice liability defendants are usually individuals. 210 Because

culpability involved in the crime, and culpability is tied to the criminal's mental state"). At
bottom, deterrence theorists and retributivists agree that there must be some moral criterion
for assessing culpability, and, for purposes of accomplice liability, this requires an examination
of the defendant's intent.
206. United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 15 (1st Cit. 2008). But see Gains v.
State, 417 So. 2d 719, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1982).
207. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
208.

See generally Benjamin H. Glatstein, Comment, Tertiary Copyright Liability, 71 U.

CHI. L. REv. 1605 (2004) (advocating for a copyright liability regime sufficient to govern the
actions of entities with no relationship to the direct infringer).
209. See Adams, supra note 18, at 635.
210. See Geraldine Scott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees: ConsideringFault-Based
Liabilityfor the ComplicitCorporation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1343, 1345-46 (2007) (noting
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determining the mental state of an organization involves the
consideration of the thoughts and perceptions of several individuals
at once with differing levels of responsibility, determining the specific
intent of an organization is comparatively difficult."' Businesses
involved in the distribution or supply of intellectual property or
components of intellectual property are usually involved in many
transactions at once. By contrast, criminal accomplices typically
cannot simultaneously conduct multiple criminal activities. As a
result, it is easier to assume that the criminal accomplice intended the
ultimate consequences of the perpetrator's activity than to assume
that a business conducting hundreds of simultaneous transactions
specifically desired the outcome caused by one of its clients. Courts
may also have difficulty in differentiating between benign business
reasons for engaging in an activity and intentional efforts to
infringe.22
Second, even if the evidence in intellectual property disputes did
lend itself to determinations of specific intent, a specific intent
requirement would prevent courts from implementing solutions to
rampant infringement problems. Requiring the same tight nexus
between the contributor's mental state and illegal activity found in
criminal law would exempt from liability all contributors that acted
with knowledge but without intent. After the Grokster decision,
successful cases of inducement infringement may be few and far
between as companies learn to avoid public statements that could be
seized upon as evidence of a culpable mental state.2" 3 Thus,
trend towards greater prosecution of individuals and lesser prosecution of firms for corporate
crime).
211. See David C. Fortney, Note, Thinking Outside the 'Black Box": TailoredEnforcement
in EnvironmentalCriminalLaw, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1627 n.120 (2003) ("Naturally, in a
small business it is much easier to prove the mens rea of business owners or managers because
there are fewer employees and each is subject to greater supervision.").
212. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1470 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (interpreting a contractual provision indemnifying the direct infringer for its
infringement as merely facilitating "the sale [of the direct infringer] at the greatest possible
price" and not probative of the contributory defendant's intent to induce infringement); see
also Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 229, 231 (2005) (noting that
antitrust scholars have rejected a focus on evidence of intent because "'bad behavior' is
sometimes just another name for competitive behavior, of the kind the legal system might want
to encourage").
213. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1413 n.228; see also 3 NIMMER, supra
note 55, at 12-115 to 12-116 (offering "easy to satisfy" suggestions on how potential
contributory infringers can minimize liability through cautious advertising practices and
refraining from certain internal communications).
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exemption of knowledgeable intermediaries from liability leaves
direct infringers as the only plausible target for enforcement of
intellectual property rights. But the sheer number of direct
infringers, as in the case of individual users of music and video filesharing services, as well as the ability in the digital age to conduct
infringing activities in remote jurisdictions with the benefit of
anonymizing technologies, often makes the exclusive prosecution of
direct infringers impractical.21 4
Courts evaluating contributory infringement cases have already
diagnosed this problem, recognizing a need for a legal mechanism
that puts pressure on online intermediaries.2 1 They have realized
that requiring too great of an overlap between mental state and
action would immunize most contributory infringers, and limiting
liability to direct infringers would jeopardize creative incentives. If
accomplice liability standards had been applied in the Amazon.com
and Visa cases, both businesses would likely have been exempt from
liability. The millions of transactions conducted by search engines
and credit card companies every day would make it difficult to
impute an intent to infringe from their behavior.216 A choice to
implement accomplice liability's nexus requirement would be a
choice to allow rampant infringement to continue unchecked.
Third, intellectual property law's non-retributive theoretical
underpinnings make requirement of a tight nexus between the
mindset of the contributory defendant and the actions of the direct
infringer unnecessary. The nexus requirement for accomplice liability
stems from criminal law's retributive basis. If citizens are to be made
to suffer for their conduct, that conduct must be considered
immoral2" 7 and the trier of fact must be certain of the citizen's
214. See Robert T. Baker, Finding a Winning Strategy Against the MP3 Invasion:
SupplementalMeasuresthe RecordingIndustry Must Take to Curb Online Piracy,8 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2000); June Chung, The DigitalPerformance Right in Sound Recordings
Act andIts Failureto Address the Issue ofDigitalMusic'sNew Form of Distribution,39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1361, 1385 (1997); see also Lemley & Reese, supra note 1, at 1427 (recognizing that
anonymity and infringement from locations outside of the United States will hamper efforts by
copyright holders to prevent illegal file sharing, but believing that enforcement efforts can still
have some success).
215. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 912, 929-30 (2005); In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 543, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2003); Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,
576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
216. See Consolidated Answering Brief of All Defendants-Appellees, Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., No. 05-15170, at 34-36 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005).
217. Moohr, supra note 160, at 774.
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improper motives.2" 8 For most crimes, the immoral nature of the
accomplice's conduct lies in her conscious decision to make someone
commit an act that she knows is wrongful. Accomplice liability's
nexus requirement limits the last resort of criminal punishment to
immoral conduct by only including defendants that intend for the
perpetrator's bad acts to occur. The rigorous nexus requirement
permits some accomplices to escape liability, but this is deemed a
worthwhile price to pay to avoid false positives.219
By contrast, instead of being grounded on commonly shared
moral values, intellectual property law's guiding purpose is
instrumental. 220 Decisions as to liability and the scope of copyright
and patent rights are often made based on a calculation of what will
generate the greatest number of expressive or inventive works in
society. 2 ' Trademark law is not calibrated necessarily to generate
more trademarks, but it is designed to provide for an efficient
marketplace that consumers can navigate as quickly and reliably as
possible.222 Both of these rationales for intellectual property
protection are in keeping with utilitarian theories in providing for
"the greatest happiness of the greatest number., 223 Accordingly,
contributory infringement doctrine focuses its attention on the
consequences of the infringement, not on the personal
218. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Part W.A.
220. COHEN ET AL., supra note 75, at 7 (explaining that the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution embraced the utilitarian rationale for copyright protection); ROBERT P. MERGES
ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 10 (rev. 4th ed. 2007)
("Utilitarian theory, and the economic framework built upon it, has long provided the
dominant paradigm for analyzing and justifying the various forms of intellectual property
protection."); Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REv. 621,
623-24 (2004) (noting the prevailing view of trademark law as designed to reduce consumer
search costs "is now nearly total," although incomplete). Although moral precepts cannot help
but be a part of any adjudication, courts and legal scholars are particularly uncomfortable with
discussions of morality and just punishment in the context of intellectual property. E.g., Sari
Louis Ferraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
("Copyright and trademark law are not matters of strong moral principle."), vacated and
remanded, 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007); cf Combs, supra note 162, at 252-53 (maintaining
that tort law has "a lesser emphasis on morality" than criminal law).
221. MERGES ET AL., supra note 220, at 11 ("The principal objective of much of
intellectual property law is the promotion of new and improved works ....
).
222. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 JL. & ECON. 265, 265-66 (1987) ("[T]rademark law, like tort law in general ... can best
be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.").
223. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 4-5 & n.1 (Prometheus Books 2007) (1780).
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blameworthiness of the defendant, by emphasizing the defendant's
material contribution. It is the impact of the contributory
defendant's actions on the direct infringer that matters most, not the
degree to which the defendant is out of step with community moral
norms. In addition, the typical remedy in any case of intellectual
property infringement is an injunction preventing the defendant's
further use of the work in question.22 4 Because the limited nature of
intellectual property relief does not inflict the same devastating costs
on defendants as criminal sanctions, there is no need to limit legal
responsibility to only those who specifically intend for the underlying
illegal conduct to occur.
In sum, contributory infringement doctrine does not profit from
analogies to accomplice liability. Criminal law relies on social norms
and widely held views of moral conduct to set the boundaries of
punishable behavior. In terms of accomplice liability doctrine, this
translates to an emphasis on the link between the defendant's mental
state and the ultimate criminal act and a corresponding lack of
attention to the defendant's actual contribution to the underlying
criminal endeavor. Given the different evidence available in
intellectual property cases, the practicalities involved in reining in
massive simultaneous online infringement, and the contrasting
theoretical justifications for criminal punishment and intellectual
property protection, analogizing accomplice liability to contributory
infringement makes little sense. If they are to be borrowed from
another body of law, contributory infringement standards must
come from a different area of legal doctrine than accomplice liability.

224. See eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(suggesting that injunctions will remain the standard remedy in patent cases because of
valuation concerns); Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next
Frontier of Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 549, 568 n.105 (2008) ("In the
intellectual property context, injunctive relief is generally the available and appropriate remedy,
but the state of the law in this area remains controversial."). The Lanham Act specifically states
that remedies for trademark infringement must be non-punitive. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 ("Such
[damages] shall constitute compensation and not a penalty."). Legal scholarship tends to agree
that relief from infringement should be tailored to incentivizing creative output, not to
proportionately calibrating punishment to the defendant's bad acts. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter,
supra note 135, at 18 (maintaining that intellectual property damages awards should be
enhanced in some circumstances by a multiplier to maintain the necessary incentives for
copyright, patent, and trademark rights holders).
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V. A THEORY OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT CAUSATION
If intellectual property's guiding rationale is utilitarian, then one
might conclude that there simply needs to be an analysis of
contributory infringement based on utilitarian principles. The
problem, however, is that the consequentialist theory behind
intellectual property protection offers little traction to those seeking
workable content for the material contribution requirement. Many
would argue that it is impossible to use theories as to the potential
economic effects of different levels of intellectual property protection
to calibrate the exact boundaries of infringement liability. 225 For
every intellectual property regime, there is a dispute as to the
economic impact of increased intellectual property protection.2 26
Utilitarian theory can only tell us so much about whether or not
entities like Visa and Google should be held contributorily liable.
Moreover, even if courts could apply economic theory to
determine the optimal level of liability for contributory infringement,
it is not clear that the law should be organized in this manner.
Criticism of law and economics scholarship posits that the rationality
of human behavior is variable. 227 It stands to reason that rational

compliance with the law decreases when the law fails to track human
intuition. Thus, it is not helpful to simply urge potential
contributory infringers to behave in a way that provides the greatest
good for the greatest number. A successful theory of accountability
for the actions of others needs to offer guidance to citizens so they
can structure their behavior accordingly. A law's motivational force

225. CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 8-9 (2008); George L.
Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About IntellectualProperty: Comment on Cheung, in
8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 19,

21-23 (John Palmer ed., 1986); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualism in the NaturalLaw of IntellectualProperty, 102 YALE L.J. 1533,
1573-76 (1993).
226. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:12, at 2-30.1 to 2-30.2 (4th ed. 2008) (stating that there is no consensus
among economists as to whether trademarks and advertising create barriers to market entry);
FRITZ MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL 165 (1984)

(opining that it may be impossible to identify the total costs and benefits of the patent system);
Salil K. Mehra, Software as Crime: Japan, the United States, and Contributory Copyright
Infringement, 79 TUL. L. REV. 265, 301-02 (2004) (discussing difficulties of calibrating a
system of copyright enforcement).
227. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structureson Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (2004).
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will be insufficient unless its basis is obvious to those affected. 228
People do not see themselves as agents who are supposed to go forth
and maximize group well-being.22 9 Instead, we need to look for
another method for determining responsibility for the acts of
another.
One way of determining responsibility for contributory acts that
is rarely employed in the accomplice liability context is causation.
Modern accomplice liability eschews a study of causation in favor of
an analysis of mental state.2 3 ° Relatively innocuous conduct that does
little to facilitate the underlying criminal act satisfies the actus reus
requirement for accomplice liability.2"3 ' The retribution rationale for
criminal sanctions apportions punishment on the basis of the
expressive content of one's behavior, not causation.23 2 Yet despite its
lack of significance in accomplice liability, causation is an important
rubric that guides other bodies of law and our own innate sense of
accountability. As discussed earlier, a viable system of accountability
must be understandable to others if it is to guide behavior. We
intuitively believe that even in the absence of fault, individuals bear
some responsibility for the consequences of their actions.233
Christopher Kutz has noted that in evaluating social responsibility
for an action, we often apply what he calls the Individual Difference
Principle. 234 The Individual Difference Principle holds that an
individual is accountable for a harm if she did something that "made
a difference to its occurrence.""2 3 If the individual's actions had no
impact on the realization of the harm, then the individual is not

228. KUTZ, supra note 92, at 129.
229. Id. at 55.
230. HART & HONORIt, supra note 174, at 325 (stating that ordinary causal limitations
are disregarded in situations where a defendant is criminally liable for harm not caused by his
own conduct but by the conduct of another); Mueller, supra note 81, at 2173 ("[S]ince the
concept of culpability provides the basis for our criminal justice system, the act requirement is
secondary to the mental element.").
231. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
232. FLETCHER, supra note 124, at 680 ("[T]hat one can contribute to a result without
causing it lies at the foundation of accessorial liability.").
233. HART & HONORt, supra note 174, at xxxv ("That we are responsible for the harm
we cause is a principle that makes an immediate appeal to common moral sensibility."); Larry
Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, CulpableActs of Risk Creation,5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
375, 386 n.32 (2008) (stating that holding actors accountable for harms they nonculpably
created "seems intuitively correct").
234. KUTZ, supra note 92, at 3.
235. Id.
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accountable.23 6
We can see this principle at work when we think about how our
own sense of responsibility is triggered by everyday events. Consider
a scenario where I agree to house sit for someone and, being
unfamiliar with their house, I accidentally bump into a vase,
knocking it to the floor. The breaking of the vase is not my fault. I
was acting with reasonable care when proceeding through the house
and definitely had no intention or even knowledge that I was going
to break the vase. Nevertheless, I will feel a sense of responsibility to
the home owner for breaking her vase. I would definitely want to
apologize for my action, and may want to pay for a replacement. The
reason for this sense of responsibility on my part is causation.
Because I caused the vase to break, even if it was not my fault, I bear
some responsibility.
Like "material contribution," causation is a term susceptible to
many meanings. It is impossible to define causation with perfect
precision given the multiplicity of potential interactions between a
secondary party and a direct infringer. Moreover, to some degree,
causation is a policy question because defining causation determines
how far the reach of the law should extend.23 7 Hence, a full account
of causal theory and how it can be applied in all contributory
infringement scenarios is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, some discussion of causation and how it might be used
to determine liability may prove useful. Causation is a legal principle
applied in many other areas of the law. Given its prevalence, judges
and juries should be comfortable using it to determine liability.2 3
What follow are some preliminary thoughts on the boundaries of
contributory infringement as suggested by causal theory.

236. See id.; see also Kadish, supra note 12, at 332 ("In common usage, as well as in the
law, whether we may be blamed for something that results from our actions turns on whether
).
we may be said to have been the cause of that result ....
237. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 320. But see Moore, supra note 14, at 407
(disagreeing with theorists who "claim a freedom for the law to define its notion of cause-infact as it pleases, to serve its own purposes").
238. HART & HONORIt, supra note 174, at 307; see also David W. Robertson, The
Common Sense of Cause in Fact,75 TEX. L. REv. 1765, 1767 (1997) (describing the "but for"
causation test as "both simple enough for everyday application in lawyers' offices and busy trial
courts and at the same time comprehensive enough to solve the recurrent types of occasionally
quite challenging causation difficulties").
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A. Liabilityfor CausalContributors
We intuitively assess causal responsibility for the actions of
another in various ways. As described below, we typically believe
there is a causal relationship when the act at issue would not have
occurred but for the action of the party responsible. Causation is
found even when another party would have likely stepped in to
perform the same facilitating act if the defendant had refused.
Causation is more likely to be inferred on the basis of affirmative
activity rather than passive inactivity. This presumption against
causation for passive behavior can be overcome, however, when the
behavior at issue represents a departure from ordinary circumstances.
1. "Butfor" causation
To the extent a causation requirement exists for accomplice
liability, it simply requires that the accomplice do something that
makes the ultimate criminal act infinitesimally more probable or
easier to accomplish. For example, in one famous case often used to
illustrate accomplice liability, the defendant sent a telegram urging
the telegraph office not to deliver a previous telegram by another
that was meant to warn the victim that he was being pursued by four
killers.2" It was by no means clear that receipt of the warning
telegram would have saved the victim's life. Nevertheless, the
Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's actions
were sufficient for accomplice liability:
The assistance given ...need not contribute to the criminal result
in the sense that but for it the result would not have ensued. It is
quite sufficient if it facilitated a result that would have transpired
without it. . It is quite enough if the aid merely rendered it easier
for the principal actor to accomplish the end intended by him and
the aider and abettor, though in all human probability the end
would have been attained without it. ...[H]e who facilitates
murder even by so much as destroying a single chance of life the
assailed might otherwise have had, he thereby supplements the
efforts of the perpetrator, and he is guilty... notwithstanding it
may be found that in all human probability the chance would not

239. State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 15 So. 722 (Ala. 1894).
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have been availed of, and death would have resulted anyway. 240
In other words, even if the criminal act most likely would have
occurred with or without the action of the accomplice, the actus reus
requirement is still satisfied. In fact, even if it can be shown that the
accomplice's aid had no impact on the ultimate criminal action, an
accomplice with sufficient mens rea may still be liable.2 4 1
Such a relaxed causation standard, to the extent it can be called a
causation standard, would be inappropriate for contributory
infringement. Criminal law ensures that its sanctions are reserved
only for those accomplices that specifically intend to aid the
defendant's conduct. Because a strict intent standard is the focus of
accomplice liability, the contribution standard for accomplice liability
can be broad in scope without offending our sense of proportionality
or just desert. When it has been demonstrated beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intended the crime to occur and acted to
facilitate it, it seems appropriate to impose criminal liability, even if
the crime would have occurred without the defendant's action. But
intellectual property law, for the reasons mentioned above, cannot
target liability solely on the basis of intent.242 The knowing
facilitation of infringement doctrine requires only a finding of actual
or constructive knowledge.243 This places increased pressure on the
material contribution requirement, making a causation standard as
broad as the standard for accomplice liability unworkable.
Instead, the causation standard for contributory infringement
should be construed more narrowly but still in a manner that
matches human intuition. The material contribution standard should
be satisfied when the act of infringement would not have occurred

but for the aid of the defendant. 244 We instinctively assign
responsibility to actors when the result at issue would not have
occurred in the absence of the actor's conduct.2 4 Under this theory
of causation, soliciting or instigating infringement would normally

240. Id. at 738-39.
241. Dressier, supranote 118, at 102-03.
242. See supra Part I.B.
243. See supra Part II.A.1.
244. Cf Dressier, supra note 118, at 125.
245. See P.S. ATiYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 121 (3d ed. 1980)
("There is no doubt that in most cases the 'but for' test is intuitively and intelligently used to
decide the issue of cause in fact.").
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be a material contribution.2 4 6 Another way to satisfy the causation
standard would be to provide for the direct infringer an unusual
service, i.e., one that is difficult to find or specially tailored to the
defendant's needs while other customers receive standardized
services. Without the contributor's provision of a unique service, the
infringement would not have occurred. As a result, the contributor
satisfies the requirement of "but for" causation.2 47
2. Causationand hypotheticalalternatives
Our theory of causation also needs to identify what does and
does not break established causal chains. For any event, there are an
infinite number of actions and conditions that may be deemed
necessary for that event to have taken place.248 But to comport with
our intuitive sense of just accountability, some actions that are
essential to the end result need to be exempted from liability. For
example, in tort law, the voluntary intervention of a second human
agent usually absolves the first human agent from responsibility. 49 If
A throws a lighted cigarette into dry brush that catches fire, she is
the cause of the fire. But if, just as the flames are about to die out, B
knowingly pours gasoline on those flames, then B becomes the cause
of that fire, not A, even though A's initial act was essential to the
creation of the fire.2 50
Contributory infringement cases often involve suppliers and
distributors of goods. Often a business will assist a direct infringer,
but one might argue that the infringement still would have taken
place even without the business's involvement because the direct
infringer could have hired another business to assist him if the first
business refused. For example, a business might provide sheets of
iron to the infringer, who shapes those sheets into an apparatus that

246. See, e.g., Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1169, 1171 (11th Cir. 1991)
(sales representative held contributorily liable for trademark infringement when he claimed to
"even the score" with a rival business by contacting manufacturers and asking them to produce
lamps identical to those produced by plaintiff).
247. HART & HONORt, supra note 174, at 159 (explaining that the law and common
intuition typically distinguishes between the causal nature of routine and independent exercises
of discretion).
248. See generally Robert C. Hilborn, Sea Gulls, Butterflies, and Grasshoppers:A Brief
History of the Butterfly Effect in NonlinearDynamics, 72 AM. J. PHYSICS 425, 425-26 (2004).
249. HART & HONORIt, supra note 174, at 73-75.
250. Id. at 74.
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infringes someone else's patent.2"' Without the supply of the iron
sheets, the infringing apparatus could not have been assembled so
the infringement would not have occurred but for the first business's
conduct. It would seem that the causation requirement has been
satisfied. Yet even though the direct infringer chose this particular
business for its iron needs, it surely could have purchased the iron
from another entity as well. Borrowing a term used by Joshua
Dressler, I will refer to such alternative entities as "hypothetical
alternative causes."2" 2 In one sense, the first business causes the
infringement by providing a material needed for the ultimate act of
infringement. But in another sense, it does not satisfy a "but for"
causation standard because a host of other businesses would have
willingly stepped in to provide the same service. In the Visa case, the
majority and Judge Kozinski battled over this notion of hypothetical
alternative cause. Kozinski rejected it, arguing that because
"infringement can always be carried out by other means," the
existence of alternative sources of aid should not prevent satisfaction
of the material contribution standard." 3 The majority, however,
suggested that the existence of other viable funding mechanisms
demonstrated that Visa's provision of payment services was not
material.2" 4
A viable causation theory for intellectual property protection
requires that the existence of hypothetical alternative causes not be
allowed to break otherwise sufficient causative chains.2 5 A contrary
rule would contradict established precedent. Just as there are other
ways than Visa to submit payments online, there are other search
engines than Google. Under the Visa majority's rationale, the
Google search engine could not materially contribute to
infringement by touting infringing websites because consumers
could choose to locate the infringing websites through other search
engines. Yet the Ninth Circuit found that Google could be
contributorily liable while exempting Visa. For consistency, a

251. See Millner v. Schofield, 17 F. Cas. 392, 392-93 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1881) (No. 9609A).
252. Dressier, supra note 118, at 131.
253. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 814 (9th Cir. 2007).
254. Id. at 797-98.
255. See HART & HONORt, supra note 174, at 249 ("In the case of a hypothetical
alternative cause, the generally accepted view is that defendant's wrongful or criminal act has
caused the harm, for which the wrongdoer is therefore criminally or civilly responsible, despite
the existence of a set of alternative conditions sufficient to produce the same harm.").
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hypothetical alternative supplier of online payment services should
not break the causal chain.
More importantly, a theory of causation that recognizes that an
actor can cause infringement by another even if hypothetical
alternative causers were available to perform the same actions
matches our own intuitive view of when facilitation of a wrong
should result in responsibility. For example, if a friend lets me
borrow his car and, due to years of wear and tear, the car breaks
down during my drive, I feel some responsibility for returning a
nonworking car to my friend. I would apologize to my friend even
though the breaking down of the car was not my fault, and I drove
the car in a normal manner. In a sense, the breaking down of the car
during the time period when I borrowed it is mere chance. If my
friend had lent the car to one other person immediately before me,
that person would have brought back a nonfunctional car, not me.
Nevertheless, because I was the one whose willful physical action
resulted in the car breaking down, I accept some responsibility.
Under the Visa majority's reasoning, a business that provides a
service to the direct infringer can always avoid liability if another
business exists to take its place. Our own intuition suggests,
however, that the actor that contributed to an event bears
responsibility even if another hypothetical actor could have just as
easily substituted in that actor's stead.2" 6
3. Failuresto act and abnormalenvironmentalcauses
Our causation theory also needs to address passive contributions
to infringement. Sometimes the contributor's causing of the
infringement will be obvious, as in the case of a business that
supplies a component that can only be used in a device that infringes
another's patent. But for that component, the direct infringer could

256. In some situations, we may intuitively believe that the supplier's contribution is too
minimal to justify the imposition of contributory liability even if the supplier's contribution is
"necessary" for the infringing activity to occur. For example, the Visa majority fretted that an
overly broad reading of the Napster definition of "material contribution" would make liable
not only credit card companies but even utilities that provide the electricity necessary for
operation of infringing websites. Visa, 494 F.2d at 800. While it may be necessary to screen
out certain de minimis activities from the material contribution requirement, the existing
doctrine should obviate some of the majority's concerns as it requires knowledge of
infringement for liability and exempts contributory defendants that distribute staple articles of
commerce without the intent to cause infringement. See supra Part I.A. 1.
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never have assembled the materials that allowed him to infringe.25 7
In other situations, however, the defendant does not take any
affirmative physical action that immediately aids the direct infringer.
A landlord may provide the site and facilities where the trademark
infringement occurs but does nothing else to facilitate the sale of
counterfeit goods. 2 8 A radio station may unknowingly permit a
purchaser of air time to play copyrighted music but offer no other
assistance to the purchaser's infringement and still be held liable.25 9
The causation principles for contributory infringement should take
into account situations where the contributor undertakes no specific
willful act that facilitates the infringement but by failing to act may
still be responsible for creating the environment where the
infringement can occur.
Accountability for certain failures to act comports with intuitive
notions of responsibility. Even when our affirmative willful behavior
is not directly involved, we often feel responsible when an injury
occurs in our presence that we could have prevented. Failure to act,
under the right circumstances, is commonly viewed in causal
terms.26 If someone drowns in my swimming pool, I feel
accountable. Even if the victim was not an invited guest and entered
my pool without my knowledge, I may still feel a sense of
responsibility for not preventing her death.
Historically, courts have been reluctant to find entities liable for
inaction. 2 " Nevertheless, liability for nonfeasance is an essential part
of the law.262 When the defendant's behavior amounts to a failure to
act, the trier of fact engages in an especially searching analysis of the
circumstances of the plaintiffs injury to determine if the defendant's
behavior falls under an exception to the general rule that defendants

257. See, e.g., Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (Conn. Cit. Ct. 1871) (No. 17,100).
258. See, e.g., Habeeba's Dance of the Arts v. Knoblauch, 430 F. Supp. 2d 709, 711-12,
714 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
259. See Rodgers v. Quests, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 212, 214 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
260. See HART & HONOR±, supranote 174, at 2-3.
261. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 200-02 (1989)
(distinguishing between "the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom,"
which triggers the protections of the Due Process Clause, and the State's failure to act to
protect the individual's liberty interests, which does not).
262. See Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking CriminalCorporateLaw, 82
IND. L.J. 411, 418-20 (2008) (describing the gradual retreat from misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction in American law).
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263
are not liable in tort for a failure to act for the plaintiff's benefit.
To assess whether the responsibility I feel for my failure to
prevent the drowning in my pool should give rise to legal
accountability, the circumstances surrounding the victim's death
must be scrutinized to look for the presence of anything unusual. In
ferreting out the cause of illegal actions, courts assess whether the
'2
behavior at issue should be considered a "cause" or a "condition. 1
A condition is a typically present environmental factor that leads to a
result. 26 The presence of oxygen is necessary for a house to catch on
fire, yet we would not describe the presence of oxygen as a cause of
the fire. Instead, the presence of oxygen is a condition. By contrast, a
cause is something that provides an explanation as to why a result
occurred. A child playing with matches would be deemed a cause of
the fire, not a condition. A parent's failure to supervise the child
while that child was in the proximity of matches might be deemed a
cause as well. In determining why the victim drowned in my pool,
bystanders would ask whether there was anything unusual about my
home or pool that attracted the victim. Did I somehow advertise the
presence of the pool to the neighborhood? Did I maintain my pool
in an inherently unsafe manner? Was the placement of my pool
unusually accessible to trespassers? Did I typically observe and
prevent outsiders from entering my pool area and fail to do that on
this occasion? The point of such questions is to determine whether
some behavior of mine can be labeled as an abnormal factor in the
victim's death, and thus a cause and not a condition. When a
contributory infringer behaves in a non-routine fashion, this is
important circumstantial evidence of causation.26 6
The difference between cause and condition is a useful way to
explain the disparate contributory infringement holdings in the Visa
and Amazon.com cases. First, Perfect 10's claim against Visa focused
on Visa's failure to prevent infringing behavior. As mentioned above,
courts are less likely to find liability for a failure to act as compared to
evidence of affirmative misconduct. Given Visa's attenuated
relationship to the directly infringing websites, it would have been

263.

See DAN C. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 853-55 (2000).

264. See HART & HONOR±, supra note 174, at 35.
265. See id.
266. Cf Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984-85 (9th
Cir. 1999) (finding domain name registrar not liable for contributory trademark infringement
after noting the routine nature of the registrar's routing services).
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particularly difficult for Perfect 10 to argue that Visa's behavior
constituted affirmative aid to the infringers. Businesses looking to
accept online credit card payments do not arrange for acceptance of
such payments with Visa directly. Instead, they contact what Visa
labels "acquirers," i.e., merchant banks. Visa remains in the
background, leaving it to the merchant banks to process the actual
transactions.267 Because Visa does not engage in any significant
activity with businesses that transact with the merchant banks that
are part of its network, its role in the infringement could only be
construed as a failure to act.268
Second, Visa's failure to act represented a typical condition of the
commercial environment. The payment processing services at issue in
Visa were entirely routine. Visa does not tailor its services for each
individual business. 269 In non-infringement contexts, credit card
companies have been found contributorily liable, but only because
they altered their typical services in a way that facilitated the conduct
of the direct tortfeasor. 27' But in its involvement with the websites
that infringed on Perfect 10's rights, Visa did nothing to depart from
standard operating procedure. Judge Kozinski maintained in his
dissent that Visa's contribution to the infringing websites was
material because the ability to accept credit card payments is crucial
to internet commerce. 27 ' While that may be true, the real question a
court should be asking is whether Visa behaved unusually with
regard to the infringing transaction. From the facts at hand, it
appears that Visa helped arrange the processing of payments that
allowed the infringement to take place, but Visa was in no sense
267. See Accept Visa Online, http://usa.Visa.com/merchants/new-acceptance/accept_
online.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (directing businesses to contact an acquirer to set up
online payments with Visa).
268. One way for a court to determine whether the defendant's action is a cause or a
condition is to ascertain whether the contributor was present at the moment of illegal conduct.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. d (1979). Not only does presence offer
circumstantial evidence that may allow a court to infer knowledge, but it also may allow a court
to conclude that the contributor's behavior was out of the ordinary. Of course, mere presence,
by itself, is not enough to demonstrate causation, but it may serve as an important sign that the
defendant's behavior was causal.
269 See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 137 (2d Cit. 2001)
(affirming district court finding that Visa does not engage in merchant-specific pricing).
270. See, e.g., Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810, 817-18 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
271. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 810-14 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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actively facilitating infringement or engaging in any behavior
different from its standard business practices for accepting credit card
transactions. Because Visa's behavior was neither active nor out of
the ordinary, it can be described as a condition of infringement but
not its cause.
By contrast, Google's conduct may be described as active and
abnormal, a cause rather than a condition. Google's actions were
qualitatively more affirmative and intimately involved with the
infringers and their infringing content than Visa's actions. To catalog
the infringing websites' content, Google scanned the infringing
websites and then stored images of the infringing websites on its
servers.72 In addition, Google framed the infringing content
alongside its own content. When a consumer viewed a thumbnail
image from the infringing website in Google's search listings and
clicked on that image, the consumer's computer screen was filled
with both the Google search listings page and the content from the
infringing websites.273 As Google's contact with the infringing
content became more intimate, its conduct appeared less like a
failure to act and more like active facilitation. We are naturally more
willing to attribute causal responsibility to affirmative conduct than
to passive behavior.27 4 Although it did not indicate that it was
applying causative principles, the affirmative character of Google's
behavior may have convinced the court to find in favor of Perfect
10.275

Google's conduct may also be seen as more out of the ordinary
than Visa's. On the one hand, there is no indication that Google
treated images from infringing websites differently than images from
noninfringing websites. On the other hand, Google employed a
radically new technology to scan, store, and provide copyrighted
images for mass consumption. In evaluating Google's directliability
under the fair use doctrine, the Ninth Circuit even described its
actions as "highly transformative., 27 6 Thus, while Visa's processing of
payments from merchants represented an activity that had been
taking place for years, Google's new search technology represented a
272. See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832-33 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
273. Id.
274. HART & HONORI, supra note 174, at 64.
275. Visa, 494 F.3d at 801-02 (distinguishing the Google case as involving allegation of
"specific acts" designed to encourage infringement).
276. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007).
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dramatic break from the status quo.
One danger in applying traditional causative principles to these
disputes is that courts might focus too much on whether the
contributory defendant's conduct was abnormal, penalizing those
businesses that invest in innovative technologies. One other causative
principle should help protect technologists from liability, however.
Liability for failure to act should only satisfy the material
contribution standard when the defendant also has the ability to
correct the infringing activity. If the contributor is present but has
no ability to stop the infringing behavior, then there is no causation.
A defendant can hardly be deemed to have caused an event through
a failure to act if it could not have prevented the event in the first
place.27 7 Again, this comports with our intuitive sense of causation
and responsibility. When someone comes to my house and drowns in
my swimming pool, I feel some responsibility, even if I took all
reasonable precautions beforehand, because there was probably some
way for me to stop the victim from drowning. On the other hand, if
a plane crashes into my house, I do not feel responsibility for the
deaths of the passengers. The difference is that there was nothing
within my power to prevent the plane crash, but conceivably simple
actions could have prevented the drowning in my pool. If Google's
contributory liability makes sense, it makes sense because it had the
ability to stop the infringing conduct but failed to do so.278
Looking for unusual or abnormal behavior in cases involving an
alleged contributor's failure to act is a better indicator of causation
than "control," which, as discussed earlier, is often cited by the
courts in determining material contribution.2 79 Use of the term
"control" threatens to import vicarious liability standards into an
evaluation of contributory liability. When the relationship between
the direct infringer and the defendant is one that gives the defendant
the right and ability to supervise the conduct of the direct infringer,
imposition of vicarious liability is permitted. 2"° Evaluation of the
277. See, e.g., Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (N.Y. 1976).
278. Although the Ninth Circuit remanded for further consideration of Google's ability
to refrain from providing access to the infringing websites, the court seemed to suggest that
Google did have such an ability as it analogized Google's situation to the Napster file sharing
system and the operator of an electronic bulletin board, both of which had been found to have
the capability of preventing the infringing activity and were held contributorily liable. Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 728 (9th Cir. 2007).
279. See suprafootnotes 57-58 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
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right and ability to supervise is dangerously similar, however, to
evaluation of the contributor's control over the direct infringer.
Vicarious and contributory responsibility are two markedly different
theories of secondary liability, and their standards should not be
mixed.2 8' Vicarious liability imposes liability on a defendant in the
absence of any knowledge, action, or contribution to the
infringement whatsoever. Instead, the doctrine simply allocates the
costs of infringement to an intermediary based on that intermediary's
relationship to the direct infringer.2 82 Contributory infringement law,
by contrast, is designed to address those situations where liability can
only be justified on the basis of blameworthiness, and not mere
agency. And one way of assessing personal blame is to assess whether
the defendant caused the illegal act.283
B. Inducement: Liability Without Causation
An objection might be made that a causation standard for
contributory liability's material contribution requirement would
exempt some parties that we intuitively believe should be liable. One
can envision a scenario where the defendant tries to encourage the
direct infringer's illegal activity, but the direct infringer misses the
defendant's cues or already has its mind made up and does not need
any additional egging on to commit the act of infringement. The
defendant might argue in such a situation that its relationship to the
ultimate act of infringement is in no way causal, and, therefore, it has
not made a material contribution. If infringement law's theoretical
basis is exclusively consequentialist, then the defendant should bear
no responsibility for conduct that has no effect on the underlying act
of infringement.
If only the knowing facilitation analysis of contributory
infringement were available, the defendant would be correct. But in
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
281. See Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2008)
(discussing the court's "duty to discern" the difference between contributory, vicarious, and
direct infringement).
282. See, e.g., Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678,
685-86 (D. Md. 2001) (explaining the necessity of an agency relationship to find vicarious
liability).
283.

GLENYS WILLIAMS, INTENTION AND CAUSATION IN MEDICAL NON- KILLING: THE

(2007)
(describing causation as a crucial "governing factor in establishing blameworthiness and
liability").
IMPACT OF CRIMINAL LAw CONCEPTS ON EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 7
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this limited situation, infringement law can take on a retributive
flavor, and lessons learned from accomplice liability prove helpful. In
the scenario outlined above, the nexus between the mental state of
the defendant and the act of direct infringement is tight. The
defendant specifically intends the infringement. In criminal law,
when the accomplice specifically intends for the perpetrator's act to
occur, proof of causation from the accomplice's activity is
unnecessary. As with the case of the telegram sender in Alabama, for
accomplice liability the key issue is whether the accomplice
unmistakably endorsed the perpetrator's criminal behavior, not
whether the accomplice's behavior actually caused the criminal act.284
Like accomplice liability, the inducement infringement doctrine
punishes actors based largely on the expressive content of their
actions. It represents a temporary departure from the utilitarian
calculations of most intellectual property law. The Supreme Court
has held that no safe harbor exists for a contributory defendant who
supplies a device capable of substantial noninfringing uses but who
also specifically intends for infringement to occur.28 Thus, a finding
of intent to induce infringement forces a court to ignore the
consequences of restricting the behavior of an intellectual property
intermediary.
The justification for such a causation-free system of liability lies
in the same retribution principles that animate criminal
jurisprudence. Criminal law examines two criteria in determining
whether the accused's behavior warrants punishment. First, there is
the subjective question of whether the accused expected harm as a
result of her actions. For the most part, actions that are taken
unintentionally or involuntarily are not subject to criminal
sanction. 286 The reason for this is that it would be unfair to impose
suffering on someone who only acted involuntarily. It would strike
too severe of a blow against personal freedom if the state could
2 87
punish citizens' actions that were not made of their own free will.

284. See supra Part IVA.

285. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934-37 (2005).
286. See Binder, supra note 182, at 1049 ("Traditionally, harm has been seen as most
culpable when caused on purpose."); Hall, supra note 9, at 777 (stating that the rule that
"moral culpability is posited on volitional conduct" is a "fundamental axiom of ethics").
287. See KUTZ, supra note 92, at 204 ("Unless citizens can reasonably predict and
control the imposition of legal sanctions, they cannot lead good and meaningful lives within
the law's constraints.").
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Second, the law investigates the reason behind the defendant's
decision to act despite an awareness that his behavior would result in
harm. Some reasons for acting in a harmful manner are adequate and
absolve the defendant from liability. For example, a motivation of
self-defense justifies a defendant's acting with the intent to cause
harm. But when the defendant elects to cause harm in a manner that
flaunts deep-seated, widely accepted social beliefs, criminal sanctions
are justified.2"' Criminal law doctrine condemns the murderer who
kills for financial gain and the rapist who violates another for
personal pleasure.2" 9 It is the expression of values that unmistakably
clash with honored, accepted social values that subjects one to a
criminal sanction, even for crimes that were only attempted but not
consummated, or for actions that merely aided the criminal activity
of another.29 °
Although it would be cruel and unusual to subject the
contributory infringer to the same sanctions as the murderer or the
rapist, the same justifications animate liability for the inducing variety
of contributory infringement. As articulated by the Supreme Court
in its Grokster opinion, the inducement analysis does not rely on the
consequences of infringing behavior.2 9 Instead, as with criminal
accomplice liability, liability for inducement infringement punishes
people for their outward expressions of commitment to unworthy
values. In evaluating whether a defendant is liable for the
inducement variety of contributory infringement, a court should
evaluate whether the two criteria for criminal punishment have been
satisfied.
Take the most common example in the case law on inducing
infringement: the manufacture or distribution of a device that allows
others to infringe. Assume that the manufacturer knows that the
device can be used to infringe but that the device also allows others

288. See Binder, supra note 182, at 1050 ("Whether costs are assigned to an activity
depends on its moral worth.").
289. See Moohr, supra note 160, at 749 (remarking that, under a theory of retributivism,
criminal law punishes only "morally wrong conduct" and the moral code likely derives from
community norms and ideals of right and wrong).
290. The imposition of liability under the felony murder rule operates on similar
principles. The felony murder rule permits the imposition of criminal sanctions for murder on
those who knowingly expect harm to result from their actions and facilitate that harm for
socially unacceptable reasons. See Binder, supra note 182, at 967.
291. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 (2005).
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to make noninfringing use of intellectual property.2 92 Although the
manufacturer knows that the device may be used by some in a
completely lawful, nonharmful manner, it also knows that others can
use the device to subvert the intellectual property interests of the
rights holder. In this situation, the first criterion for the imposition
of sanctions under criminal law, expectation of harm, is met. The
manufacturer knows its device fosters infringement that will reduce
the value of the property interest held by the rights holder.
The second criterion for imposing criminal sanctions is that the
defendant's reason for acting in a manner that can cause harm is
socially unacceptable. To satisfy this criterion, the defendant's
reasoning cannot be susceptible to multiple interpretations or fall
into an ambiguous moral area. Instead, it must be unmistakable that
the reasons for imposing harm on others clash with generally
accepted ethical principles. The inducement doctrine tracks this
criterion. For inducement infringement to be found, there must be a
"clear expression" of the intent to facilitate infringement.29 3 In the
Supreme Court's view, the Grokster file sharing service was liable
because "[t]he unlawful objective [was] unmistakable." 9 4 In other
words, Grokster's actions were not susceptible to multiple
interpretations. Grokster satisfied the second criterion under criminal
law because the reasons for its decision to act in a way that harmed
the interests of copyright holders were indefensible. Grokster, by
seeking to profit through infringing acts of others, expressed a
reason for its conduct that was offensive to basic values of property
ownership.
On the other hand, when a defendant knowingly distributes a
device capable of some infringement but justifies its behavior
through a belief that downstream users of the device will be
engaging in fair use, then the second criterion for criminal liability is
not satisfied. For someone to be guilty of inducing infringement,
they must know that the behavior they are intentionally encouraging
is illegal. If the defendant is not choosing to engage in the harmful
activity for a socially unacceptable reason, the justification for
criminal liability drops away. Thus, to the extent that courts have left
292. See, e.g., Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (defendant manufactured software program that purchasers could use to replicate
copyrighted typeface).
293. Grokster,545 U.S. at 919.
294. Id. at 940.
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this question unresolved, a claim for inducement infringement
should not be available when the contributory defendant subjectively
believes in the legality of the direct infringer's conduct.2 9
As with accomplice liability, the standard for inducement
infringement must be construed rigorously to avoid false positives.
By trumping the safe harbor established for substantially noninfringing devices, inducement theory represents a significant
weapon in the hands of intellectual property rights holders. As a
result, the plaintiff should be able to use the doctrine only when the
contributory infringer's specific intent to infringe is apparent and
unmistakable. Simply knowing that infringement is likely is not
enough. Given the ambiguous nature of the fair use defense in
copyright and trademark law29 6 and the inherent difficulties in
determining specific intent,2 9 7 liability for intentional inducement of
infringement should be rare.
VI. CONCLUSION

Courts seeking to plug the doctrinal holes of contributory
infringement have resorted to analogies from criminal law. At first
glance, criminal contributory liability principles seem like a natural
fit. Like intellectual property law, criminal law holds some individuals
accountable for the illegal acts of others based on their own actions
and mental state. But accomplice liability is very different from the
current incarnation of contributory infringement doctrine. Whereas a
contributory infringer must "materially" contribute to the
infringement, an accomplice's actions need not make a difference to
the performance of the ultimate criminal act. And while for most
crimes it must be proved that the accomplice intended for the
criminal activity to occur, a contributory infringement defendant
may be liable even if she was indifferent to the direct infringer's
conduct.
It would be a mistake to treat accused contributory infringers as
a type of accomplice. Differences in proof and available evidence
mandate a different contributory liability regime for intellectual

295. See supra Part II.B.
296. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the FirstAmendment, 70 TENN. L.
REV. 1095, 1165 (2003); Erez Reuveni, Authorship in the Age of the Conducer, 54 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 285, 312 (2007).
297. See supra Part IV.B.
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property infringement. Causation offers an intuitive method for
assessing the responsibility of one actor for the actions of another.
Applying causative theory, the material contribution requirement for
knowing facilitation of infringement would be satisfied when the
infringement would not have occurred but for the accused
contributor's behavior. Certain failures to act should also result in
contributory liability, but only when the failure to act represents a
departure from background norms. On the other hand, criminal law
does offer some guidance for courts struggling to define the
boundaries of inducement infringement, where evidence of a
culpable mental state is more important than the materiality of the
contributor's conduct. These suggested approaches to contributory
infringement doctrine match common sense expectations of the
responsibility we owe to others. Parties to contributory infringement
suits deserve predictable and consistent rulings. They also deserve a
body of doctrine that comports with social intuitions of fairness and
blame.
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